The Role of State Political Parties in Congressional Elections by Geras, Matthew
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA
GRADUATE COLLEGE
THE ROLE OF STATE POLITICAL PARTIES
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY







THE ROLE OF STATE POLITICAL PARTIES
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
BY THE COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF
Dr. Michael H. Crespin, Chair




Dr. Hans J.G. Hassell
c© Copyright by MATTHEW J. GERAS 2020
All Rights Reserved.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to many people for their help and support both while working on my
dissertation and throughout my time in graduation school. First I would like to thank
my committee, Mike Crespin, Chuck Finocchiaro, Tyler Johnson, Sam Workman, Christan
Grant, and Hans Hassell, for their mentorship, guidance, and feedback on my research. I
would also like to thank all of the faculty and staff in the Political Science Department at
the University of Oklahoma and at the Carl Albert Center for all the support they have
given me. I am particularly indebted to my chair and advisor Mike Crespin for all that he
has done for me over the past five years. From my second day of work, when you included
me on a new research project in the archives, to our numerous job market strategy sessions,
to my dissertation defense, I never once doubted your commitment to my success. I only
hope my countless unannounced stops by your office to ask endless questions hasn’t caused
you to reconsider your open-door policy because doing so would be to the detriment of your
future students. I would also like to thank Sarina Rhinehart, Wesley Wehde, Jessica Hayden,
Kassandra Galvez, Jon Klos, Daniel Johnson and all of my other friends, classmates, and
colleagues for their friendship and intellectual and emotional support. I would not have
survived graduate school without you and I could have never imagined making such great
friends while in graduate school. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their unwavering
love and support. Even from halfway across the country I have always known you were there




2 Women Running the Party and Women Running for Congress: An Ex-
amination of State Party Diversity and Candidate Emergence in the 2018
Midterm Elections 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The Underrepresentation of Women in Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 The Role of Parties and Elites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4.1 Representation of Women in State Political Parties . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Engaging the Next Generation: An Exploration of State Party Member-
ship and Youth Participation 28
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2 Youth Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.2.1 Political Parties and Youth Political Participation . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.4.1 Youth Engagement in State Political Party Organizations . . . . . . . 38
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4 Do Party Rules Matter?: An Examination of State Party Bylaws and
Congressional Nominations 52
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.2 Political Parties and Primary Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2.1 The Role of State Party Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 Data and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4.1 Party Rules and Party Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
v
4.4.2 Measuring Party Influence in the 2018 Midterm Elections . . . . . . . 63
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74




Using an original dataset of state party bylaws, this dissertation examines the institu-
tional role of state political parties in congressional primaries. Specifically, I consider how
representative state political parties are of the general public, whether the varying levels
of representation found in each state party influence who runs for Congress, and whether
state political parties are able to influence levels of electoral competition through provisions
of their bylaws. Overall, I find both state Democratic and Republican parties vary in the
extent to which they prioritize gender representation and youth representation in their state
central committees through their party rules. However, these rules only seem to influence
the candidate emergence process during Democratic primaries. Specifically, in 2018, Demo-
cratic women were more likely to run for the House of Representatives when representing a
state party chaired by a woman and when representing a state party which granted party
committee membership to an allied women’s group. Similarly, state Democratic parties were
more likely to nominate younger candidates for the House of Representatives as the number
of youth party members in their state central committee increased. Beyond candidate emer-
gence, I find state party rules also influenced levels of electoral competition during the 2018
congressional primary elections, albeit differently for each party. State Democratic parties
were less likely to see divisive primaries when they avoided policies that required the party
to remain neutral during contested primaries. In comparison, state Republican parties were
less likely to see divisive primaries, and also saw fewer primary candidates in general, when




Despite the vast amount of research dedicated to political parties in the U.S., there is
still much to be learned about the maneuverings of political parties during congressional
primary elections. Two recent books make the argument political parties should be viewed
as networks that are able to control nominations for state legislatures and Congress. This is
in contrast to popular conventional wisdom which argues direct primaries have made elec-
tions candidate-centered. First, Masket (2009) argues informal party organizations, which
are made up of officeholders, activists, donors, and other political brokers, are able to control
nominations to the California Legislature. He shows from 1910 to the early 1950s, political
parties were powerless in California due to the progressive reforms of allowing candidate
cross-filings and forbidding party labels on ballots. During this time period, incumbents
were able to win reelection with minimal competition by winning both the Democratic and
Republican primaries (Masket 2009). However, once party labels were returned to ballots in
1954, incumbents were no longer able to win multiple primaries, and informal party organi-
zations, like those run by Maxine Waters and Bill Thomas, were able to emerge and control
nominations to the state legislature by recruiting, endorsing, and funding their preferred can-
didates (Masket 2009). More broadly, Hassell (2018) argues political parties can use their
political resources to clear the primary field for their preferred candidates in congressional
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elections, particularly in Senate races and the most competitive House races. Specifically,
he finds congressional candidates with the highest level of party support, measured as the
number of donations received from a donor who also gave to the party’s congressional cam-
paign fund, are less likely to drop out of their primary and more likely to win their primary
(Hassell 2018).
There are several commonalities between these two accounts of political parties manipu-
lating legislative primary elections. First, both view political parties as broad, diverse net-
works similar to Cohen et al. (2008; 6), who define a political party as a “coalition of interest
groups, social groups, activists, policy demanders working to gain control of government for
their goals.” Second, it seems like a lot of the types of party activities highlighted by both
Masket (2009) and Hassell (2018) are occurring behind the scenes, sometimes completely
unseen by the voting public.
Ultimately, this leads to the question, what role do parties in their institutional form, a
political party’s formal organization and rules, play in shaping elections? This is an impor-
tant question that has mostly been addressed at the national level. While there is research
on the implications of national party rules, such as how the organization of presidential pri-
maries influences presidential elections (Norrander 2006, Norrander & Wendland 2016) and
representation at national party conventions (Kirkpatrick 1975), with some exceptions, less
is known about the rules that govern state and local political parties. This is despite the fact
state and local parties govern more elections and manage many of the day to day activities
of the Democratic and Republican Party. For example, state party bylaws govern among
other things, how individuals are elected to party office, when state party organization are
allowed to endorse candidates, and how party resources can be spent.
In order to learn more about the role of state political parties in congressional elections,
I collected and coded the party bylaws in place during the lead up to the 2018 midterm
elections for all state Democratic and Republican parties. I combined this data with bio-
graphical information about each state party chair. Overall this new dataset of party rules
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and leaders contains information on the structure of each state party organization, the formal
membership of each state central committee, whether each party can endorse candidates dur-
ing contested primaries, and when these rules can be changed, among other things.1 In the
forthcoming chapters, I use this original dataset to answer several research questions related
to state political parties and their institutional role in shaping congressional elections.
First, I examine levels of representation in state political parties and I consider whether
these varying levels of diversity in state parties influences who runs for Congress. Specifi-
cally, in Chapter 2, I consider these questions in the context of gender representation. Using
my new dataset of state political party bylaws and demographics of state party chairs, I
construct three measures of gender diversity in each state political party, whether each party
was chaired by a woman, granted committee membership to an allied women’s group, and
required gender parity among their committee members. I find Democratic parties are more
likely to be chaired by a woman and to require gender parity among their members, but Re-
publican parties are more likely to grant membership to allied women’s groups. Considering
the implications of these rules, I find Democratic women are more likely to run for Congress
representing parties that grant membership to an allied women’s group and parties chaired
by a woman.
In Chapter 3, I consider the same questions about representation in state political parties
and its implications on who runs for Congress in the context of age. I operationalize youth
representation within each party by counting the number of formal party members associ-
ated with either the state’s College Democrats/Republicans, Young Democrats/Republicans,
Teenage Republicans/High School Democrats, or otherwise identified as youth members by
the party’s bylaws and predict state parties with higher levels of formal youth representation
will lead to higher levels of youth political participation and younger candidates for Congress.
I find state Democratic parties are more likely to grant voting party committee membership
to the Young Democrats than state Republican parties are to grant voting party membership
1My new dataset of state political party bylaws is available at http://matthewgeras.com/data/.
3
to the Young Republicans. However, the opposite is true of youth political organizations
organized around college students and teenagers. While there is no evidence that variation
in youth party membership influences levels of youth voter registration or voter turnout,
I find state Democratic parties are more likely to have youth nominees for the House of
Representatives as they increase the degree of youth representation in their state central
committees.
In Chapter 4, I consider whether state party rules influence a state party’s ability to
control levels of competition in congressional primaries. Specifically, I theorize political
parties will have an easier time achieving their preferred outcome of less competitive primary
elections when they have bylaws that centralize power within the state central committee.
To test this expectation, I operationalize party centralization and power as whether or not
elected officials are represented within each party’s formal membership and whether or not
each party has a neutrality policy when it comes to contested primaries. I find party power
correlates with party control, but this trend varies by political party. State Democratic
parties are less likely to see divisive primaries when they have rules in place allowing the
state central committee to endorse their preferred candidates. State Republican parties are
less likely to see divisive primaries, and also see fewer primary candidates in general, when
they guarantee ex-officio party membership to their co-partisan elected officials. Finally,
Chapter 5 summarizes my findings and places my dissertation in the broader context of
what we know about the role of political parties in congressional primary elections.
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Chapter 2
Women Running the Party and
Women Running for Congress: An
Examination of State Party Diversity
and Candidate Emergence in the 2018
Midterm Elections
2.1 Introduction
In February 2019, Jessica Patterson was elected chair of the California Republican Party,
making her the first woman to hold the position (Mai-Duc, Ulloa & Chabria 2019).1 While
campaigning for party chair, Patterson emphasized the need for inclusivity and made the
argument anyone who identifies as a Republican should be welcomed to the party (Mai-Duc,
Ulloa & Chabria 2019). Similarly, after being elected chair of the Missouri Democratic Party
in 2018, incoming party chair Jean Peters Baker pronounced the party was welcoming of all
1This chapter has been published at Party Politics. See (Geras 2020)
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Missourians (Thomas 2018). Shortly after Peters Baker’s election, Kay Hoflander was elected
chair of the Missouri Republican Party marking the first time both major state parties were
led by women at the same time (Dial 2019).
Despite these recent examples of women advancing to the top-level leadership positions
of state political parties, like most levels of government in the United States, women remain
underrepresented among the leaders of state political parties. Moreover, the lack of descrip-
tive representation among state party chairs is particularly concerning because past research
finds the underrepresentation of women in party leadership positions contributes to fewer
women running for elected office (Lawless & Fox 2010).
This paper evaluates the theory that greater gender diversity among political parties and
elites increases the number of women willing to run for elected office. Using a new dataset
of provisions in state political party bylaws and demographics of state party chairs in the
lead up to the 2018 midterm elections, I evaluate whether women are more likely to run
for Congress representing state political parties with higher levels of gender diversity among
their state central committee membership and leadership.2 I find during the 2018 midterms,
Democratic women were more likely to run for the House of Representatives in states where
the state Democratic party granted committee membership to an allied women’s organization
and in states where the state party was chaired by a women. In contrast, the emergence of
Republican women was not influenced by the degree of gender diversity among the committee
membership and leadership of state Republican parties. Ultimately, this paper contributes
to our knowledge of political parties, representation, and candidate emergence. First, it
provides a new dataset which can be used to measure levels of descriptive representation
among the committee membership and leadership of state political parties. Moreover, this
paper provides additional evidence that the demographic makeup of political parties can
have significant implications on who runs for office.
2Whenever I refer to party committee membership, I am referring to the individuals elected or appointed
to a state political party as outlined in their rules, not party voters or self-identifiers.
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2.2 The Underrepresentation of Women in Politics
The discipline is divided over whether electoral discrimination is a primary cause of
women being underrepresented in government. Empirically, women are no less likely than
similarly qualified men to win elections (Burrell 1994, Darcy, Welch & Clark 1994, Lawless
& Pearson 2008). Moreover, men and women run similar campaigns and in many cases have
similar electoral resources available to them (Dabelko & Herrnson 1997, Burrell 2014, Hayes
& Lawless 2016).3 However, others argue these assessments do not show a complete picture.
Since bias and discrimination may not appear in vote totals and not all women who run for
office are the same, it has been suggested existing empirical research has not fully considered
variations in candidate and incumbent quality (Fulton 2012, Murray 2015).4 As a result,
many successful women candidates are more qualified than traditional measures suggest.
Just as not all women candidates are the same, some states and districts are more accepting
of women candidates than others (Windett 2011, Palmer & Simon 2012) meaning some
women face tougher electoral challenges. Additionally, women candidates, even incumbents,
are often seen as vulnerable and face more competition than men in both primary and
general elections (Palmer & Simon 2005, Lawless & Pearson 2008). Republican women are
particularly disadvantaged by the recent trend of fewer moderates running for Congress
(Thomsen 2017) and the perception they are too liberal (King & Matland 2003).
Beyond the electoral hurdles women face, a lack of women candidates contributes to the
underrepresentation of women. Women are less likely than similarly qualified men to express
interest in running for elected office (Lawless & Fox 2010) and this gender gap in political
ambition develops at an early age (Fox & Lawless 2014, Shames 2017). Overall, women are
more sensitive to the potential costs associated with running for office (Fulton, Maestas,
Maisel & Stone 2006, Carroll & Sanbonmatsu 2013) and are more likely to consider their
own qualifications and experiences, as well as others’ opinions, when deciding whether to
3But also see (Kitchens & Swers 2016)
4In fact, the perception that voters hold gender stereotypes influences many aspects of campaigning
including campaign strategy (Dittmar 2015).
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run (Bledsoe & Herring 1990, Carroll & Sanbonmatsu 2013).5
2.2.1 The Role of Parties and Elites
The gender gap in political ambition is directly linked to candidate recruitment. A grow-
ing consensus finds one reason women remain underrepresented in government is they are
less likely to be recruited to run for office (Niven 1998, Lawless & Fox 2010, Carroll &
Sanbonmatsu 2013). This is especially true when political parties and elites recruit can-
didates from traditional party networks and local offices (Lawless & Fox 2010, Crowder-
Meyer 2013) where women are underrepresented and seen as being part of the out-group
(Niven 1998). This problem hurts Republican women disproportionately because there are
many more women in the pool of potential Democratic candidates compared to the pool
of potential Republican candidates (Crowder-Meyer & Lauderdale 2014). Moreover, Demo-
cratic women have greater access to successful candidate training programs and PACs then
do Republican women (Kreitzer & Osborn 2019). Beyond recruitment, elites can also partake
in gatekeeping by dissuading certain candidates from running and when they do, men are
normally advantaged over women (Sanbonmatsu 2006). While this bias may be implicit, op-
posed to explicit, it is still influential because political elites prioritize candidate recruitment
efforts for most levels of government (Broockman 2014).
Even when women, especially Republican women, are recruited to run for office, they
are less likely than men to respond positively (Preece & Stoddard 2015, Preece, Stoddard &
Fisher 2016). Driven by the perception party elites will offer greater assistance to men (Niven
1998, Butler & Preece 2016) and the fact women are more likely than men to be discouraged
to run for office, some women may not run even if asked (Carroll & Sanbonmatsu 2013).
5Experimental evidence suggests many women are election averse regardless of their qualifications
(Kanthak & Woon 2015).
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2.3 Theory
The theory that diverse political parties will be represented by more diverse candidates
is well supported. In fact, promoting women to positions of power within political parties
has been offered as a potential solution to the problem of women being underrepresented
in government (Niven 1998). The argument behind this relationship is threefold. First,
when political parties and elites become more diverse, they will be less likely to discriminate
against historically non-traditional candidates. Second, diverse parties are more likely to
recruit women to run for office and are more successful in doing so. Finally, women in
positions of power, such as party leadership, may inspire future generations of women to
become involved in politics.
As stated previously, women are less likely to be recruited to run for office because they
are often seen as belonging to an out-group (Niven 1998). However, as political parties
become more diverse, this bias should be weakened, if not eliminated, because it will become
more difficult to distinguish out-group members from in-group members. In the context of
this study, this means political parties with diverse committee memberships should be less
likely to bias their recruitment efforts against women and more likely to recruit women to
run for office. Existing research supports this notion. First, women are more likely to recruit
other women to run for office (Niven 1998, Crowder-Meyer 2013). In one particular study
with a similar research design to the one utilized here, Cheng and Tavits (2011) find during
the 2004 and 2006 Canadian national elections, women were more likely to be nominated
for office from major parties when the local party president was a woman.6 Moreover,
recent research finds women are more likely to respond to recruitment efforts made by other
women opposed to men (Pruysers & Blais 2019). This means not only are parties comprised
6More broadly, comparative politics research strongly supports the theory presented here. For example,
Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015) reveal inclusiveness at the early stages of a party’s candidate re-
cruitment process increases the number of women candidates in elections for parliament. Similarly, Caul
(1999) finds both high levels of women working at internal party offices and party rules intended to increase
the number of women in national parliaments contribute to better representation for women. However, the
influence of women serving in party leadership on women’s representation varies between proportional and
non-proportional representation systems (Kunovich & Paxton 2005).
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of women, and led by women, more likely to recruit women candidates, they are more likely
to be successful in their efforts.
It should be acknowledged not all candidates are recruited to run for office. However,
even if state parties are not actively recruiting candidates in every district, this does not
mean the composition of a party’s state central committee has no influence on the candidate
emergence process. First, when party organizations, at both the national and local level, do
actively recruit candidates, they are often successful in their efforts (Maisel & Stone 2014).
Moreover, many self-starters having existing contacts with party organizations, or at least
have some form of contact with a party organization prior to deciding to run (Kazee &
Thornberry 1990). Overall, since party organizations can also dissuade candidates, and there
is a perception men will receive greater assistance from elites than women, gender diverse
parties will positively influence the electoral calculations of potential women candidates even
if they are not actively recruiting women.
Finally, diverse political parties should inspire more women to run for office. A growing
body of literature argues women in positions of power can inspire other women to become
politically active (Campbell & Wolbrecht 2006, Bonneau & Kanthak 2018). For example,
Ladam, Harden, and Windett (2018) examine whether women governors and senators have
the ability to encourage more women to run for the state legislature either by acting as
symbolic role models and/or by recruiting more women to run for office from their positions
of power. They find better support for the symbolic representation argument. Specifically,
they find women with no ability to recruit other candidates, senators and governors from
neighboring states, and women with a limited ability to recruit other women, losing women
candidates for U.S. Senate and governor, both have positive effects on more women running
for the state legislature. If losing women candidates for governor and senator, and women
governors and senators in neighboring states, can motivate more women to run for office,
the same is probably true of women serving on state party committees, particularly women
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in leadership positions.7 What is more, in comparison to governors and senators, who may
lack the opportunity to directly recruitment more women (Ladam, Harden & Windett 2018),
past research acknowledges political parties play an important role in candidate recruitment.
Overall, diverse political parties are more likely to be represented by women candidates
because they limit the potential for biased recruitment, actually recruit more women, and
inspire more women to run for political office.
2.4 Methodology
Having explained why diverse political parties should lead to more diverse candidates,
I now outline my methodology for testing this theory. The dependent variable is the num-
ber of non-incumbent women candidates running for the House of Representatives in each
Democratic and Republican primary.8 Figure 2.1 displays the number of non-incumbent
women candidates in all 2018 primary elections for the House of Representatives. Despite
2018 being dubbed a second “Year of the Woman”, a majority of both party’s primary elec-
tions saw no women candidates. Overall, 350 out of 435 Republican primaries, 80.5%, and
240 out of 435 Democratic primaries, 55.2%, had no non-incumbent women candidates. Not
7It could be argued party chairs are less visible than candidates for governor or senator and may not
symbolically inspire women to run for office. It is not clear this is the case. One of the ways I identified
state party chairs is through news articles. If the media cover party conventions and the election of party
chairs, some are made aware of the members and leaders of state parties. Without using a survey to ask
voters, it is unclear voters are significantly less aware of party leaders compared to losing candidates or the
leaders of neighboring states. After all, Delli Carpini and Ketter (1996) find only 35% of respondents knew
the names of both of their U.S. Senators (pg. 74-75). Nonetheless, it is possible state party chairs are not
visible enough to symbolically motive others to run for office in which case, the relationship between diverse
parties and diverse candidates found in this paper is likely driven by more traditional candidate recruitment
efforts.
8It is worth discussing my procedures for handling elections held in California, Louisiana, and Washington,
due to their use of top-two/blanket primaries and elections held in Connecticut, Utah, and Virginia due to
their occasional practice of selecting nominees through party conventions. The results presented in the paper
include all observations and I treat blanket primary states as if each party held separate primaries. This
means I have one observation for each political party in each district as I do for all other states. This is
necessary because my dependent variable varies at the primary level. I already control for primary type in
my models. In order to include convention states, I include a new independent variable called convention
state for observations from these three states. Two alternative model specifications, which produce the same
results, can be seen in the Appendix; they include removing individual observations from the convention
states if a convention was held in place of a primary in a particular district and restricting my analysis to
the 44 states that hold traditional partisan primaries.
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surprisingly, when women did run for the House of Representatives, they were more likely
to run in Democratic primaries. Of the 85 Republican primaries that featured at least one
non-incumbent woman, only 13 primaries had more than one woman and 9 of these primaries
saw only two women. On the Democratic side, out of the 195 primaries with at least one
non-incumbent woman, 71 primaries featured more than one woman. Since less than 10%
of all primaries in 2018 saw more than one non-incumbent woman candidate, I use a binary
measure of candidate emergence where each primary is coded 0 if no non-incumbent women
candidates ran for the House of Representatives and 1 if at least one non-incumbent women
candidate emerged. I use the candidate file in Brooking’s 2018 primary election dataset to





















Democratic Party Republican Party
Figure 2.1: Women Primary Candidates
Note: This figure displays the number of non-incumbent women candidates in 2018 primary elections
for the House of Representatives.
My main independent variables of interest, which will be discussed in the next section, are
measures of gender diversity in the membership of each party’s state central committee, but
9I would like to thank Sarina Rhinehart for her assistance in aggregating this data to the primary level.
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it is also necessary to consider other variables that influence whether women run for office.
First, I use Trump’s 2016 district-level voteshare in order to account for the ideological
leanings of each district (Nir 2012). Next, I consider whether an incumbent is seeking
reelection in each primary due to the sizable advantages incumbents hold over their opponents
and the fact women are more likely to run for open seats (Ondercin & Welch 2009). For
each primary, I code whether there is a party incumbent in the district, an opponent party
incumbent in the district, or whether the district has an open seat. I also control for the
type of primary being held in each state according to the National Conference on State
Legislatures since candidates likely consider which voters are eligible to vote before deciding
to run (National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). In order to control for a pool of
women potentially willing to run for Congress in each state, I include the percentage of women
serving in each state legislature in 2018 (Center for American Women and Politics 2018).
Additionally, I control for the degree of legislative professionalism in each state (Squire 2017).
2.4.1 Representation of Women in State Political Parties
There are several ways to measure gender diversity in state party committees. The most
obvious way is to compare the proportion of party committee members who are women
to the proportion of committee members who are men. Beyond considering the number
of women holding formal membership in each state party committee, it is also necessary
to consider if women hold party leadership positions. Finally, it is possible a party aligns
itself with a women’s group or organization, such as the Arizona Federation of Democratic
Women, whose goals among other things, may be to represent specific group(s) of women or
to work towards the advancement of women in politics, by granting them party committee
membership.
These three constructs of gender diversity are theoretically straight forward, but mea-
surement is not. Similar to how there is a lack of consistent data on women’s representation
in local politics (Holman 2017), it is difficult to collect data on the committee membership
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of state and local political parties. While some parties provide a membership roster on their
website, many do not. My solution is to collect membership information from the bylaws of
each state party. Unlike committee membership rosters, with only a few exceptions, almost
all parties provide a copy of their bylaws on their website. Overall, I was able to collect the
bylaws governing each state Democratic and Republican party at the time of each state’s
filing deadline for 2018. By reading and coding each party’s bylaws, I was able to measure
all three of my constructs of gender diversity and thus create three independent variables.10
First, I differentiate whether each political party grants committee membership to an allied
women’s group.11 Second, I create a binary variable that differentiates whether each party
was chaired by a woman or man at the time of the state’s filing deadline.12 Lastly, I create
a binary variable that differentiates between parties that require gender parity among their
committee members and parties that do not.13
Figure 2.2 displays descriptive representation of women in state Democratic and Repub-
lican parties in the lead up to the 2018 midterm elections along the three dimensions just
discussed. First, it displays the number of parties that grant committee membership to
an allied women’s group. This is the most common form of representation guaranteed to
women in Republican parties and the only form of women’s representation more common
10Since the degree of gender diversity in each state party committee, is a latent variable that cannot be
directly observed and I construct three variables that measure different dimensions of the underlying concept
of diversity, there is potential for multicollinearity. As a result, I replicate my findings by both creating an
additive index and by only using one measure of gender diversity at a time and theses results, shown in the
Appendix, are stable. Additionally, to account for the potential state party gender diversity correlates with
specific state or district characteristics, the Appendix replicates my analysis when controlling for geographic
region, political culture, the degree of women friendliness in each district, and varying levels of state party
strength and the results are consistent to what is presented here. Though this is not a perfect research
design, these additional models should help to minimize the possibility that some underlying state or district
characteristic(s) is driving my results.
11This most commonly takes the form of the group’s president receiving membership to the state central
committee.
12This variable did not come from party bylaws and was instead collected from each party’s website, news
articles, and Google searches.
13This variable is probably better described as identifying parties that at least make an attempt to main-
tain gender parity among their committee members according to their bylaws. In some cases, a party requires
gender parity among their elected members, but also grants ex-officio membership to elected officials, chair-
man appointments, etc., which can sometimes mean gender parity is not perfectly maintained. Nonetheless,
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Figure 2.2: Representation of Women in State Political Parties
Note: This figure displays three measures of women’s representation in state party committees:
whether a women’s group is granted representation in the party committee, whether the party is led
by a woman, and whether the party requires gender party among its committee members. Among
the parties granting committee membership to a women’s group, one Democratic party and four
Republican parties only grant nonvoting membership to these organizations.
in Republican parties compared to Democratic parties. Overall, 35 state Republican par-
ties and 23 state Democratic parties grant some form of party committee representation to
an aligned women’s group. A partnership with an allied women’s group should help state
parties to recruit more women to run for office by helping them to identify a larger poor of
potential women candidates. First, members of these groups may personally have political
ambitions. In this case, the formal alliance between their organization and the state party
would help them to make connections with elites and to potentially become a visible mem-
ber of the larger party network. Additionally, through the course of their work, women’s
organizations are likely better able to identify potential women candidates than are party
organizations, since they might be less reliant on traditional party networks, where women
remain underrepresented (Crowder-Meyer 2013).
It should be noted not all women’s groups have the same aims and goals since the
Democratic and Republican Parties view their relationship with these groups differently.
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The Democratic Party views their constituency groups as a way to exercise power, with
constituency groups advocating for their interests within the party; while the Republican
Party views their affiliated groups as extensions of the party, who work towards party goals
(Freeman 1986). These competing views of constituency groups likely means the influence of
granting party committee membership to an allied women’s group on the number of women
running for Congress varies across party.
Next, Figure 2.2 displays the number of state parties chaired by a woman. In the lead
up to the 2018 midterm elections, only 31 of the 100 state-level Democratic or Republican
parties were led by women. Women were more likely to hold the position of chair in Demo-
cratic parties. Specifically, 20 state Democratic parties were led by a woman, but only 11
state Republican parties were led by a woman. Since party leaders are more visible than
other party members, parties chaired by a woman probably have the best opportunity to
symbolically inspire more women to run for office.
Finally, Figure 2.2 displays the number of state parties with rules in place attempting
to ensure gender parity in party committee membership.14 While it is more common for
both Democratic and Republican parties to require gender parity in their party committee
membership than it is for either party to have a woman serve in the position of chair,
state Democratic parties are more than twice as likely as state Republican parties to have
provisions in their bylaws requiring gender parity. Specifically, 47 state Democrat parties,
compared to only 21 state Republican parties, make a clear attempt to achieve gender parity
through provisions in their bylaws.15 Requiring gender parity will lead to more women
14For gender parity, I was able to compare my coding to data previously collected. In comparison to
Freeman (2008), I found only two differences in regard to gender parity which is likely the result of these
two parties changing their bylaws over the past 15 years.
15Beyond the fact women tend to affiliate with the Democratic Party, this trend is likely explained by
the decision of the Democratic National Committee to address the issue of gender representation at the
national level. The 2018 Democratic National Committee’s bylaws state, “the membership of the Democratic
National Committee, ... state central committees, and all national official Party Conventions, committees,
commissions, and like bodies shall be as equally divided as practicable between men and women... the
variance between men and women in the group cannot exceed one”(The Democratic National Committee
2018, 8). As a result, it is not surprising nearly all state Democratic parties attempt to require gender parity
among their committee members in their bylaws. Even the three parties that do not explicitly call for gender
parity in their bylaws are likely seen by the DNC as doing enough to work towards the party’s goal of gender
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running for office since it is likely the best way to mitigate the out-group bias against
potential women candidates since by definition women will have equal representation within
the party.16
Using bylaws to collect measures of gender diversity is not without potential drawbacks.
One drawback is it restricts my analysis to one election cycle, since historical state party
bylaws are not easily accessible, but this can be remedied by maintaining my dataset of
bylaws into the future. Second, there is potential a party’s bylaws could differ from their
actual practices. For example, a party may not have a formal rule requiring that each
county is represented by one man and one woman, but may have a norm or tradition of
doing so. This drawback is without a clear solution; however, I argue formal rules are more
important than traditions or norms because they are harder to amend or eliminate. Within
their bylaws, each party has requirements and procedures for amending party rules, but this
is not the case for traditions or norms.17 Despite these potential drawbacks, I believe party
bylaws are the best source of data for measuring a party’s commitment to gender diversity
since not all parties maintain publicly available membership rosters and using bylaws does
not require the use of elite surveys.
diversity to satisfy the national party; although, even if these parties are not complying with the national
bylaws, the DNC does not have much of an incentive to penalize their state parties as doing so may hurt the
party. Nonetheless, in my forthcoming analysis, my measure of gender parity in state party committees will
be of greater theoretical interest in Republican primaries where there is more variation.
16While theory suggests parties requiring gender parity should be represented by more women candidates,
there could be unintended consequences to these policies. For example, see (Bos 2015).
17Alternatively, a party may be regulated by state law. In the case of gender parity, I can again compare
my data collection to previous work. Freeman (2008) identifies states with laws mandating state parties to
require gender parity among their committee memberships as of 2004. Based on this data, I found only one
party, the New Jersey Democrats, that requires gender parity due to law, but does not mention doing so
in their bylaws. As a result, I coded them as requiring gender parity because this law is still in place. All
other states mandated by law to require gender parity, as of 2004, was already coded correctly based solely
on my reading of their bylaws. If additional states have passed similar laws since 2004, and a state party
does not explicitly mention the law or address the issue in their bylaws, it would not be reflected in my data.
However this is unlikely because the number of states with laws pertaining to gender representation in party
committees has decreased over time (Freeman 2008).
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2.5 Results
Table 2.1 displays the results of six logistic regression models estimating the influence of
state political party gender diversity on the emergence of women in primary elections for the
House of Representatives during the 2018 midterm elections. The first model analyzes all
primary elections, with a variable that differentiates between Democratic and Republican
primaries, and the second and third models consider Democratic and Republican primaries
independently. This is necessary because women face different paths to elected office in each
party (Sanbonmatsu 2002). Models three through six replicate this analysis, but remove
primary elections for open seats to better consider variations in any potential incumbency
advantage. In these three models, I consider two factors that might influence the emergence
of women in congressional elections. First, I control for the gender of each incumbent since
women are more likely to run against other women, which means they typically face more
primary competition (Palmer & Simon 2005, Lawless & Pearson 2008). Second, I control
for each incumbent’s cash on hand at the beginning of the FEC’s two-year reporting period
for 2017/2018 since women are more likely than men to cite the need to raise money as a
reason not to run (Lawless & Fox 2010).
In terms of the influence of state party gender diversity, there are stark differences be-
tween Democratic and Republican primaries. The degree of gender representation in Re-
publican state party committees appears to have no significant influence on the emergence
of non-incumbent women candidates in congressional elections. Specifically, non-incumbent
Republican women were no more likely to run for office when their party granted committee
membership to an allied woman’s group, when their party required gender parity among
their committee membership, or when their party was chaired by a woman. In contrast,
non-incumbent Democratic women were more likely to run for the House of Representatives
when their party granted committee membership to an allied women’s group and when their
party was chaired by a woman. Moreover, these relationships were present regardless of
whether primaries for open seats were included in the analysis.
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Beyond gender diversity in state party committees, non-incumbent women were more
likely to run in open seat elections compared to elections where an incumbent was seek-
ing reelection. Additionally, when an incumbent was seeking reelection, Democratic women
were more likely to run when the incumbent represented the opposing party compared to
their own party. From a theoretical perspective, these findings are unsurprising. Most po-
tential candidates view open seats as more winnable since none of the candidates benefit
from incumbency and if a candidate was going to challenge an incumbent, they have greater
incentives to defeat someone from the opposing party than someone from their own party.
None of the other variables significantly influenced the emergence of non-incumbent Repub-
lican women. However, non-incumbent Democratic women were more likely to run in states
utilizing partially open primaries opposed to closed primaries and in states with higher levels
of legislative professionalism, but were less likely to run in districts where Trump performed
well in 2016. Additionally, in incumbent races, non-incumbent Democratic women were more
likely to run in states where unaffiliated voters were allowed to participate in the Democratic
primary, but were less likely to run in states using blanket primaries. Finally, elements of the
incumbency advantage seemed to have little influence on non-incumbent women running for
Congress. Women incumbents did not face additional women challengers and non-incumbent
women were not deterred from running for Congress when incumbents had large campaign
war chests.
Figure 2.3 displays predicted probabilities of at least one non-incumbent woman running
for the House of Representatives broken down by political party and varying levels of gender
diversity in a state party committee. The top panel displays predictions for Democratic
primaries. In 2018, just under 45% of Democratic primaries had at least one non-incumbent
woman candidate, but Figure 2.3 shows state Democratic parties can potentially increase
the number of women in congressional primaries by granting an allied women’s group party
committee membership and by electing a woman chair. A state Democratic party that
requires gender parity among their elected members, as mandated by the DNC, but does
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Table 2.1: Non-Incumbent Women Candidates in Primary Elections
All Primaries Incumbent Primaries
All Democratic Republican All Democratic Republican
Women’s Group 0.37† 1.24∗∗∗ −0.12 0.49∗ 1.70∗∗∗ −0.15
(0.20) (0.32) (0.33) (0.23) (0.39) (0.39)
Gender Parity −0.33 −0.58 −0.24 −0.23 −0.35 −0.20
(0.27) (0.81) (0.31) (0.32) (1.09) (0.36)
Woman Chair 0.13 0.56† −0.14 0.28 0.96∗ 0.12
(0.22) (0.33) (0.44) (0.24) (0.38) (0.54)
Democratic Primary 1.58∗∗∗ 1.51∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.27)
Trump Vote 0.04 −6.20∗∗∗ −0.18 0.01 −7.77∗∗∗ −0.52
(0.62) (1.38) (1.18) (0.69) (1.60) (1.42)
Opponent Incumbent 1.80∗∗∗ 4.30∗∗∗ 0.90∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 4.91∗∗∗ 0.77
(0.21) (0.52) (0.43) (0.21) (0.62) (0.48)
Open Seat 3.00∗∗∗ 5.10∗∗∗ 2.44∗∗∗
(0.28) (0.60) (0.37)
Partially Closed −0.22 −0.28 −0.00 −0.43 −0.34 −0.78
(0.40) (0.54) (0.65) (0.46) (0.60) (0.84)
Partially Open 0.50 1.26∗ 0.16 0.59† 1.67∗∗ 0.03
(0.32) (0.49) (0.51) (0.35) (0.56) (0.56)
Unaffiliated Voters 0.05 0.55 −0.04 0.19 1.18∗ −0.20
(0.32) (0.50) (0.51) (0.36) (0.59) (0.60)
Open 0.04 0.20 0.18 −0.12 0.46 −0.35
(0.27) (0.40) (0.42) (0.30) (0.45) (0.50)
Blanket −0.21 −0.77 0.39 −0.39 −1.03† 0.07
(0.35) (0.52) (0.57) (0.39) (0.57) (0.67)
Women in Legislature −1.00 −2.13 −0.23 −1.81 −3.32 −0.66
(1.63) (2.36) (2.48) (1.83) (2.61) (2.95)
Professionalism 0.24 4.00∗∗ −1.51 0.71 5.83∗∗ −1.34
(0.91) (1.52) (1.35) (1.03) (1.80) (1.55)
Convention State 0.30 −0.39 0.40 0.29 −1.06 0.86
(0.44) (0.68) (0.62) (0.50) (0.77) (0.72)
Incumbent Cash −0.00 0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Woman Incumbent −0.05 0.04 0.19
(0.25) (0.39) (0.38)
Constant −2.89∗∗∗ −1.28 −1.65 −2.79∗∗ −2.01 −1.01
(0.77) (1.40) (1.27) (0.85) (1.75) (1.41)
N 870 435 435 748 374 374
AIC 870.24 438.42 407.12 725.74 373.17 324.34
BIC 1175.42 682.94 651.64 1039.73 624.33 575.50
logL −371.12 −159.21 −143.56 −294.87 −122.59 −98.17
† p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
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Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability of a Non-Incumbent Woman Candidate by
Gender Diversity in State Party Committees
Note: This figure displays the predicted probabilities and 95% confidence intervals, of at least one
non-incumbent woman running for the House broken down by party and varying levels of gender
diversity in a state party committee. Predictions are calculated using models 5 and 6 from Table 2.1
with all other variables set to their median or mode values corresponding to each model. The Demo-
cratic predictions are based on a state party requiring gender parity, but the Republican predictions
are not since these are the modal characteristics of each party.
not grant party committee membership to an allied women’s group and is chaired by a man
has about a 0.50 probability (0.32 to 0.67) of having at least one non-incumbent women run
for the House of Representatives. In comparison, a state Democratic party that requires
gender parity and grants party committee membership to an allied women’s group has 0.84
probability (0.72 to 0.92) of having at least one non-incumbent woman run. Similarly, a
state Democratic party that requires gender parity and is chaired by a woman has a 0.72
probability (0.49 to 0.87) of having at least one non-incumbent woman run for Congress.
While the confidence intervals on the woman chair estimate overlap with the estimates of
the gender parity only estimate, Table 2.1 reveals both of these relationships are statistically
significant. Moreover, Figure 2.3 shows they are substantively significant since electing a
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woman chair or granting party committee membership to an allied women’s group increases
the probability of having at least one non-incumbent woman candidate by about 0.20 and
0.35 respectively.
The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 displays similar predictions for Republican primaries. In
2018, just under 20% of Republican primaries had at least one non-incumbent woman can-
didate. Since nothing other than open seats seem to influence the emergence of Republican
women, the predictions in Figure 2.3 mirror the results of the 2018 elections. There is about
a 0.19 probability (0.08 to 0.40) of at least one non-incumbent woman running when a state
Republican party does not mandate any form of gender diversity. In comparison, when a
state Republican party grants committee membership to an allied women’s group, there is a
0.17 probability (0.07 to 0.35) of having at least one non-incumbent woman run and when a
state Republican party is led by a woman, there is a 0.21 probability (0.06 to 0.52) of having
at least one non-incumbent woman run for the House. Overall, increased gender diversity of
state Republican party committees has neither a statistically, nor substantively, significant
influence on non-incumbent women running for Congress.
2.6 Discussion
In the lead up to the 2018 elections, state Democratic parties were more likely to be
chaired by a woman and more likely to require gender parity among their committee mem-
bers, but state Republican parties were more likely to grant party committee membership to
an allied women’s group. Ultimately, these demographics of state political parties play a role
in the candidate emergence process at least among Democrats. Specifically, non-incumbent
Democratic women are more likely to run for the House of Representatives in states where
the state Democratic party grants committee membership to an allied women’s group and
in states where the Democratic party is chaired by a woman. These findings are meaningful
because they reveal a potential path for increasing the number of women in Congress. If
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the Democratic Party continues to commit efforts towards increasing the diversity of their
state and local party committees, not only will state political parties be more reflective of
the populations they represent, but in time Congress, and perhaps other political offices, will
also become more diverse. However, these results also present a concerning trend, mainly
that levels of gender diversity in state Republican parties had no influence on the emergence
of non-incumbent Republican women. The most likely explanations for this is Republican
women face a more challenging partisan environment (Thomsen 2019), Republicans are less
likely than Democrats to embrace identity politics (Crowder-Meyer & Cooperman 2018),
and the Republican Party views their affiliated organizations as party actors opposed to
allies with independent goals (Freeman 1986). Overall, as long as only one of the two major
political parties is taking steps to increase the number of women in government, true gender
parity among elected officials is unlikely to be achieved.
While this project only examines one election cycle, the 2018 midterm elections provide a
stringent test of the theory. A record number of women ran for Congress in 2018 (Zhou 2018).
If anything, this means women were more motivated than usual to run for office and the
influence of the mechanisms that traditionally influence when and why women run for office,
such as political party diversity, may have been diminished in 2018. Despite this, state
political party diversity was still related to women running for Congress. Nonetheless, future
research should test this theory across future election cycles and other types of elections,
which would add to the external validity of these findings. Overall, this research contributes
to the fields of political parties, representation, and candidate emergence by providing a new
test of existing theory and by proving a new dataset which can be used to measure and track
levels of descriptive representation within state political parties.
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2.7 Appendix
Appendix Table 2.2 replicates the results of Table 1 Model 5 (the Democratic model
for incumbent primaries) with greater consideration of states using blanket primaries and
conventions to select their nominees. The first model replicates the results after removing all
observations where a party nominee was selected by a party convention instead of a primary.
All of these observations came from either Connecticut, Utah, or Virginia. The second
model replicates the results after restricting the sample to the 44 states that do not use
blanket primaries or conventions to select their nominees. This means all observations from
California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Utah, Virginia, and Washington were removed. Overall,
Appendix Table 2.2 reveals my findings are not a result of my decision to treat states using
blanket primaries or conventions as if they were holding separate partisan primaries.
Appendix Table 2.3 replicates the results of Table 1 Model 5 (the Democratic model for
incumbent primaries) with greater consideration of measurement of party gender diversity.
Models 1-3 replicate my findings by only using one measure of party gender diversity at a
time. Model 4 replicates my findings by combining all three measure of gender diversity
into an additive index. Overall, Appendix Table 2.3 reveals that neither my measurement
decisions, nor potential multicollinearity, biased my findings.
Appendix Table 2.4 replicates the results of Table 1 Model 5 (the Democratic model
for incumbent primaries) when controlling for district and state level characteristics that
may correlate with state party gender diversity. Models 1 and 2 control for two different
measures of geographic region as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S.
Census respectively (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014), model 3 controls for state political
culture (Elazar 1994, pg.284), model 4 controls for Palmer and Simon’s women friendly
index which is their 2012-2020 calculated probability of each congressional district electing
a women based upon census data (Palmer & Simon N.d.), and model 5 uses Mayhew’s 1 to
5 rating of traditional party organizations in order to consider varying levels of state party
strength (Mayhew 1986). While not a perfect identification strategy, Appendix Table 2.4
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adds validity to my finding by considering potential confounding variables. For sake of space,
only the pertinent variables are displayed in this table.
Table 2.2: Eliminating Convention States and Blanket Primaries
Conventions Removed Partisan Primaries
Women’s Group 1.63∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.40)
Gender Parity −0.45 −0.87
(1.07) (1.07)
Woman Chair 0.81∗ 0.82∗
(0.36) (0.38)
Trump Vote −7.38∗∗∗ −7.64∗∗∗
(1.58) (1.80)
Opponent Incumbent 4.79∗∗∗ 4.51∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.68)
Partially Closed −0.48 −0.16
(0.61) (0.62)
Partially Open 1.57∗∗ 1.51∗∗
(0.55) (0.55)










Incumbent Cash 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)








† p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Closed Primary
25
Table 2.3: Measuring Gender Diversity









Trump Vote −7.38∗∗∗ −5.94∗∗∗ −6.06∗∗∗ −7.32∗∗∗
(1.56) (1.46) (1.48) (1.57)
Opponent Incumbent 4.74∗∗∗ 4.23∗∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 4.76∗∗∗
(0.60) (0.55) (0.56) (0.60)
Partially Closed −0.64 −0.57 −0.29 −0.17
(0.58) (0.57) (0.59) (0.60)
Partially Open 1.27∗ 0.36 0.67 1.61∗∗
(0.51) (0.45) (0.47) (0.56)
Unaffiliated Voters 1.10∗ 0.37 0.59 1.33∗
(0.55) (0.51) (0.51) (0.58)
Open 0.03 −0.25 0.12 0.58
(0.41) (0.40) (0.43) (0.45)
Blanket −0.74 −0.78 −1.03† −1.12∗
(0.54) (0.56) (0.57) (0.55)
Women in Legislature −2.50 −3.74 −3.16 −2.46
(2.47) (2.52) (2.42) (2.50)
Professionalism 3.69∗ 0.59 2.30 5.82∗∗
(1.53) (1.38) (1.58) (1.82)
Convention State −0.45 −0.14 −0.71 −1.25†
(0.72) (0.69) (0.74) (0.76)
Incumbent Cash 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Woman Incumbent 0.04 −0.03 −0.02 0.02
(0.39) (0.38) (0.37) (0.38)
Constant −1.52 1.62 −0.53 −3.93∗∗
(1.04) (1.48) (1.05) (1.34)
N 374 374 374 374
AIC 376.02 396.82 392.08 373.89
BIC 595.78 616.58 611.84 593.65
logL −132.01 −142.41 −140.04 −130.95
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Closed Primary
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Table 2.4: Potential Confounding District and State Influences
BLS Region Census Region Culture Women Friendliness Mayhew Score
Women’s Group 1.61∗∗ 1.99∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗
(0.51) (0.45) (0.42) (0.41) (0.40)
Gender Parity −0.08 −0.04 −0.54 −0.48 −0.55
(1.28) (1.16) (1.12) (1.10) (1.12)
Woman Chair 1.04∗ 1.16∗∗ 1.09∗∗ 0.82∗ 1.05∗





























N 374 374 374 368 372
AIC 378.74 374.84 375.35 365.79 369.83
BIC 739.77 673.08 657.90 631.54 636.32
logL −97.37 −111.42 −115.68 −114.90 −116.92
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = West, West, Traditionalistic
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Chapter 3
Engaging the Next Generation: An
Exploration of State Party
Membership and Youth Participation
3.1 Introduction
It is well known that even as Congress continues to grow more diverse, it remains unrep-
resentative of the United States. One way in which Congress is unrepresentative of the larger
U.S. population is in respect to age. While strides were made in 2018 with Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez and Abby Finkenauer both becoming the youngest women ever elected to Congress at
the age of 29 and Congress becoming younger in general (Zhou 2019), young people remain
underrepresented in Congress. At the start of the 116th Congress, the House of Repre-
sentative was composed of 53.9 percent Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964), 31.5 percent
Generation X (born 1965-1979), and 6 percent Millennials (born 1980-1996) (Desilver 2018).
However, Baby Boomers made up only 25 percent of the 2017 U.S. labor force compared to
33 percent Generation X, and 35 percent Millennials (Fry 2018). Overall only some of this
discrepancy can be explained by the constitutional requirement that members of the House
28
of Representatives be at least 25 years of age because as of the start of the 116th Congress
in 2019, most Millennials were eligible to serve in the House of Representatives.
A recent stream of research identifies a lack of political ambition among young individuals
as one leading cause of this underrepresentation (Lawless & Fox 2015, Shames 2017). The
purpose of this paper is to examine whether the membership requirements of state Demo-
cratic and Republican parties, mainly the lack of youth representation within these formal
party organizations, also contributes to members of Congress on average being much older
than the general population. Moreover, I examine whether a lack of youth participation in
party organizations is also associated with lower levels of other forms of political participa-
tion among young people. Specifically, I predict state political parties with higher levels of
youth representation will see higher levels of youth political participation compared to polit-
ical parties who fail to prioritize youth representation within their formal party organization.
Second, I expect political parties with higher levels of youth representation will have younger
candidates for Congress compared to political parties who fail to prioritize youth representa-
tion within their formal party organization. To test these hypotheses, I create a new dataset
of state party rules by collecting and coding provisions within the bylaws of all 100 state-
level Republican and Democratic parties. I operationalize youth representation within each
state party by counting the proportion of formal state central committee members associ-
ated with either the state’s College Democrats/Republicans, Young Democrats/Republicans,
Teenage Republicans/High School Democrats, or otherwise identified as youth members by
the party’s bylaws.
I find state Democratic parties are more likely to grant voting party committee mem-
bership to the Young Democrats than state Republican parties are to grant voting party
committee membership to the Young Republicans. However, the opposite is true of other
youth political organizations. College political organizations, the College Republicans and
College Democrats, and teenage political organizations, the Teenage Republicans and the
High School Democrats are more likely to be granted voting party committee membership
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in state Republican parties compared to state Democratic parties. Finally, while I do not
find evidence that this variation in youth party membership influences levels of youth voter
registration or voter turnout, I find state Democratic parties are more likely to have youth
nominees for the House of Representatives as they increase the degree of youth representation
in their state central committees.
Overall, this paper adds to the discipline’s knowledge of youth representation by examin-
ing levels of youth representation in state political parties. Additionally, it shows one way to
increase youth representation in Congress, at least among Democrats, is for political parties
to do a better job of recruiting young individuals to take part in their formal party organiza-
tions. Ensuring better representation for young people in political institutions is important
because representation, in regard to age, influences policy outcomes (Curry & Haydon 2018).
Additionally, increasing youth representation will also have a spillover effect on other areas
of descriptive representation because younger generations are more racially and ethnically
diverse than their predecessors (Rosentiel, Keeter, Horowitz & Tyson 2008).1
3.2 Youth Political Participation
Political participation can take many different forms. In this paper, I focus on youth en-
gagement in two forms of political participation, voting, which is probably the most common
form of political participation, and running for office, which is probably one of the least com-
mon forms of political participation. In regard to voting, it has long been acknowledged that
voter turnout is correlated with age such that younger individuals are less likely than older
individuals to vote (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980, Leighley & Nagler 2014). Many explana-
tions have been offered as to why this age gap in voting exists. First, a recent meta-analysis
of over 90 empirical studies on the individual determinants of voter turnout, identifies age
and education as the two most common explanations of turnout (Smets & Van Ham 2013).
1Descriptive representation occurs when a representative shares characteristics and/or past experiences
with their constituents (Pitkin 1967).
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Since education reduces the costs associated with civic engagement (Hillygus 2005), and
high school and college students are still pursuing higher education, they fall into a cate-
gory of individuals less likely to participate in the political process. Similarly young people
often have lower levels of political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995, Carpini &
Keeter 1996, Carpini 2000, Milner 2010, Wattenberg 2012) which is often a skill necessary
to fully participate in the political process.2
An argument could be made that young individuals are being rational in their decision
not to vote (Downs 1957, Aldrich 1993). As with all voters, not only is it unlikely that their
individual vote will be decisive, but their status as inconsistent or non-participators means
politicians do not see them as a priority (Carpini 2000). Nor in comparison to some other
groups, such as veterans and seniors, do they always have policy issues that consistently
require them to become politically active (Mettler 2002, Campbell 2002).3 Finally, unless
they were allowed to preregister (Holbein & Hillygus 2016, Hart & Youniss 2018), many
young voters may not yet have had enough opportunities for voting to become a habit
(Plutzer 2002, Gerber, Green & Shachar 2003, Denny & Doyle 2009).
Recent scholarship has discovered an even more disturbing pattern in regard to youth
political participation. On the whole, younger generations have less political ambition than
their predecessors. Specifically, while most high school and college students have the desire
to help their communities and solve the problems facing society, they do not view politics
as a good way to achieve these goals (Lawless & Fox 2015, Shames 2017). High school
and college students are turned off by the idea of running for elected office because they
have a negative perception of modern politics, with many young people believing politicians
are untrustworthy and only in politics for themselves (Lawless & Fox 2015, Shames 2017).
Moreover, they believe the costs associated with running for office, loss of privacy, the need
to fund raise, etc., far outweigh the potential benefits of winning elected office (Lawless &
2Also see Condon and Holleque (2013) who find general self-efficacy, like political efficacy, increases
political participation among young individuals.
3This is despite the fact that young voters often have consistent policy agendas (Tedesco, McKinney &
Kaid 2007).
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Fox 2015, Shames 2017). This trend exists even among graduate and law students, who
would be expected to be among the youth most likely to be interested in a political career
by the nature of their positions (Shames 2017).
3.2.1 Political Parties and Youth Political Participation
Youth participation in formal political party organizations, and the effect of such partic-
ipation on other forms of political participation, continues to be an understudied aspect of
youth political engagement. This is likely due to the fact young people rarely hold positions
of power within political parties and in an international context young people are under-
represented in political parties (Cross & Young 2008, Scarrow & Gezgor 2010). While over
time, most individuals have come to view themselves as being more ideologically extreme,
they are also more likely to identify themselves as politically independent; this is especially
true among young voters (Abramson 1976, Twenge, Honeycutt, Prislin & Sherman 2016).
If young people do not wish to align themselves with a specific partisan affiliation, it is not
surprising they are underrepresented in party organizations.
Moreover, a cross-national study of 14 year-olds reveals most young people do not view
joining a political party as an important aspect of civic engagement (Torney-Purta 2001).
In the context of Canadian political parties, young adults were most likely to join a political
party when their parents were already members and when they held the beliefs that political
parties provide a path towards change and are responsive to their grassroots members (Cross
& Young 2008). In the United States local party leaders acknowledge that young people are
not active enough in politics and while they often have the capacity to mobilize young voters,
they rarely prioritize doing so (Shea & Green 2007). In the remainder of this paper, I argue
that if political parties, mainly state parties, were to commit themselves towards mobilizing
young people, specifically by bringing them into their formal organizations, state central
committees, there would be an increase in youth political participation.
32
3.3 Theory
Overall, young people, like everyone else, become engaged in politics when they have the
motivation, opportunity, and availability to do so (Carpini 2000). Currently, young adults
lack the motivation to become involved in politics because they have a negative opinion of,
and lack of faith in, governmental institutions, they lack the opportunity to become involved
in politics because parties and candidates mostly ignore them, and they lack the availability
to become involved in politics because they lack the information and knowledge necessary
to become involved (Carpini 2000). I argue if political parties were to grant young people
formal roles in their organizations, young people would have more motivation, opportunity,
and availability to become more politically active.
In regard to motivation, I argue young people would have more positive views of gov-
ernmental institutions, and thus be more motivated to participate in political activities, if
they were better represented within them. It has long been known that descriptive repre-
sentation leads to more trust in political institutions and greater substantive representation
(Mansbridge 1999, Tate 2001, Swers 2013, Broockman 2013). Moreover, recent research finds
voters are less likely to vote for co-partisan candidates, or even to vote at all, as the age
gap between the voter and candidate increases (Pomante & Schraufnagel 2015, Webster &
Pierce 2019). Similarly, newspaper coverage of presidential elections suggests one of the rea-
sons young voters participated at higher rates in 1992 and 2008 was because there were young
candidates running for office who prioritized engaging young voters through new methods
of get-out-the-vote appeals (Pomante 2017). Together these studies provide examples of
increased youth participation in instances where young people felt better represented. This
combined with the notion that representative institutions increase trust and substantive rep-
resentation in government, lends credence to the theory that if political party organizations
were more representative of the general public, in this case in regard to age, young people
would be more politically active. Moreover, since negative views of political institutions
are one of the reasons, young people often have low levels of political ambitions (Lawless &
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Fox 2015, Shames 2017), diverse parties would likely even spur more young people to partake
in even advanced forms of political participation, such as running for elected office.
In addition to motivating young voters to participate in higher levels of political par-
ticipation, age diverse political party organizations would also increase the number of op-
portunities available for young people. First, the mere act of joining a party organization
provides individuals with more opportunities, as well as the political and social capital nec-
essary to participation in politics. There is significant evidence that participation in commu-
nity groups, organizations, and institutions leads to higher levels of political participation
(Putnam 2001, Flanagan 2003, Quintelier 2008, Terriquez 2015). This is especially true when
young people are given leadership opportunities (Flanagan 2003, Quintelier 2008). Moreover,
I expect this effect will be amplified when the organization in question is designed around a
political purpose, as are political parties. Indeed, while it is a different case from the United
States, at one point, as many as 41 percent of all city councilors in Belgium started their po-
litical careers in a political party’s youth organization (Hooghe, Stolle & Stouthuysen 2004).
That being said, political parties and elites in the U.S. prioritize candidate recruitment for
elections at most levels of government (Broockman 2014) and local party committees seem
like an obvious place to start. This means that if young people were better represented
within party organizations, it is more likely they would be viewed as viable candidates for
office and thus recruited to run.
Finally, as party organizations gain more youth members, young people will have more
availability to become involved in politics because they will have the opportunity to become
better informed. Party organizations with strong youth memberships will be less likely to
ignore young voters. In fact, as youth representation within party organizations increases,
young voters would likely become a prime target of political parties. This is significant
because research finds peer to peer interaction, recruitment, and education increases political
participation (Shea & Harris 2006). For example, get out the vote efforts led by young
individuals increases youth voter turnout (Bennion 2005, Ulbig & Waggener 2011, Costa,
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Schaffner & Prevost 2018). In fact, one of the most difficult aspects of turning out young
voters is that they are much more difficult to contact than voters at-large (Nickerson 2006).
However, this should be less of an issue for party organizations with a lot of youth involvement
since their members would interact with other young voters on a daily basis at school, work,
etc., and young people will be more receptive to the information and opportunities presented
to them if they are being offered from their peers. This would include running for office since
potential young candidates would be more likely to see a youth diverse party as an available
resource than they would a party that does not represent them.
Ultimately, young people often lack the motivation, opportunity, and availability to be-
come more active in politics (Carpini 2000). However, their lack of motivation, opportunity,
and availability is at least in some ways a result of their current lack of political partic-
ipation. In this sense, the problem of minimal youth engagement in politics seems like
a self-reinforcing paradox with no end in sight. In the preceding section, I have laid the
groundwork for why I believe age diverse state political party organizations are the solution
to this dilemma. In the remainder of the paper, I use the varying levels of youth member-
ship in parties’ state central committees to evaluate this theory in the context of the 2018
midterm elections. Specifically, as seen in the formal hypotheses below, I first predict state
political parties with higher levels of youth representation will see higher levels of youth
political participation. Second, I predict state political parties with higher levels of youth
representation will see younger candidates for Congress.
Hypothesis 1: State political parties with higher levels of youth representation will see
higher levels of youth political participation.
Hypothesis 2: State political parties with higher levels of youth representation will see
younger candidates for Congress.
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3.4 Methodology
In order to evaluate my theory that state political parties with higher levels of youth
representation will see higher levels of other forms of youth political participation, I use
three different measures of political participation as my dependent variables. My first two
dependent variables measure two common types of political participation, registering to
vote and actually voting in an election. Specifically, I collect the percentage of individuals,
between the ages of 18 and 34, who were registered to vote and who voted in the 2018
General Election, according to the United States Census Bureau (United States Census
Bureau 2019).4
My final dependent variable measures a less common form of political participation,
running for elected office. Ideally, I would be able to collect the age of every candidate who
filed to run for Congress in 2018 and determine both the age of the youngest candidate
running in each primary election as well as the average age of all the candidates in each
primary election. However, while databases of declared candidates are maintained (Kamarck
& Podkul 2018), each candidate’s age is not as readily available. In order to collect each
candidate’s age, I used a variety of sources including, but not limited to Ballotpedia, Vote
Smart, news articles, campaign websites, and Wikipedia. Despite using such a variety of
sources, I was not able to identify the age of every candidate. Since there is a good chance
there is systematic bias in this missing data, mainly that the youngest and oldest candidates
are less willing to report their age out of fear of ageism, I determined the best measure of age
available to me was the age of each party’s nominee in each congressional district. Overall,
I was able to determine the age of all but 23 major party congressional nominees in 2018.5
Since the benefits of incumbency often lead to careerism in Congress, it is safe to assume
that on average, party nominees who are incumbent members of Congress will be older than
4All of these individuals would meet the age requirements for both the Young Democrats and the Young
Republicans.
5The fact that it was difficult to find the ages of many congressional candidates means it would likely be
difficult to replicate this study on more localized elections, such as elections for state legislatures, where it
would be even more likely for younger candidates to run for office.
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most other party nominees. During the 2018 midterm elections, this proved to be the case,
especially among Democratic candidates, as seen in Figure 3.1. In both political parties, the
youngest nominee was 25 years of age. In the Democratic Party, the oldest nominee was 82
and in the Republican Party, the oldest nominee was 85 years of age. Among all Democratic
nominees, the average age was 54, but among incumbents it was closer to 62 and among
non-incumbents it was closer to 48. Among all Republican nominees, the average age was 55,
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Figure 3.1: Age of Nominees for the House of Representatives
Note: This figure displays the distribution of the age of each major party nominee for the House of
Representatives broken down by party and incumbency status.
Since it is doubtful that varying levels of youth party membership have a linear effect on
youth candidate emergence, my final dependent variable is a binary measure of whether or
not each nominee is less than or equal to 40 years of age. The selection of 40 as the cutoff
point for identifying youth candidates, is not arbitrary. The Republican party identifies
Young Republicans as being 18 to 40 years of age and the Democratic Party identifies Young
Democrats as individuals under the age of 36. Since I needed a measure that is consistent
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across both parties, and all members of the House of Representatives need to be at least 25
years of age, I selected the more conservative measure of a youth candidate. Additionally, the
vast majority of youth party members and youth candidates, as defined in this paper, would
be classified as a Millennial, which is the generation most underrepresented in Congress.
Overall about 12 percent of all Republican nominees and about 20 percent of all Democratic
nominees were 40 years of age or younger.
In order to account for other factors that may influence the age of each nominee, I
control for the median age of voters in each congressional district (U.S. Census Bureau 2017).
Additionally, I control for each nominee’s gender because compared to men, women tend
to wait to run for elected officer later in life in order to have fewer personal or familial
obligations such as young children (Lawless & Fox 2010). Next, I consider whether each
primary has a party incumbent, an opponent incumbent, or is taking place in a district with
an open seat. I also consider whether each nominee was chosen via a contested primary, an
uncontested primary, or an convention. In order to control for the ideological leanings of
each congressional district I control for Trump’s 2016 district-level vote. Finally, I control
for legislative professionalism using the Squire index (Squire 2017) and the type or primary
used in each state according to the National Conference of State Legislatures (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2016).
3.4.1 Youth Engagement in State Political Party Organizations
There are at least six groups, whose purpose is to encourage greater political participation
among young voters, aligned either formally or informally through similar goals and values,
with the national Democratic Party or the national Republican Party. First, both parties
have ally groups dedicated to encouraging participation among college students. The College
Democrats describe themselves as the official student arm of the Democratic National Com-
mittee and meet on campuses across the country (Democrats 2018); similarly, the College
Republican National Committee is an Independent 527 PAC with state federations in all 50
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states and over 250,000 total members (CRNC 2019). Second, both parties have ally groups
focused on activating young voters more generally. The Young Democrats of America are a
non-federal 527 political organization dedicated to mobilizing individuals under the age of 36
and to elect Democrats (YDA 2018). On the conservative side of the ideological spectrum,
the Young Republican National Federation, also a 527 organization, engages Republicans
between the ages of 18 to 40 (YRND 2016). Finally, both parties have ally groups intended
to recruit individuals who are not yet old enough to vote or who are newly registered to vote.
The High School Democrats of America are currently active in 47 states and territories with
a goal of providing a outlet for high school students active in politics (HSDA 2019) and the
National Teen Age Republicans a political group targeted at high school students that has
clubs in every state (TARS 2019).
At the state level, political parties vary in regard to whether they recognize the state-
level chapters of these organizations as auxiliary groups and whether these groups are granted
party committee membership within the formal party organization. Some state parties grant
the organization’s president, or another member, representation with the power to vote on
matters before the party. Other parties allow representative(s) from these organizations to
attend party meetings without granting them voting rights. Still other parties set quotas for
the number of youth members, but without formally granting these positions to members
of auxiliary organizations. Finally, a fourth group of state parties do not grant any form of
representation to these youth political groups, nor do they require certain party members to
be younger than a specified age requirement.
Figure 3.2 displays the number of state Democratic and Republican parties that grant
party committee membership to their state chapter of the Young Democrats/Republicans,
College Democrats/Republicans, and/or High School Democrats/Teenage Republicans. Fur-
thermore, it differentiates between parties that grant these organizations voting membership
and parties that grant these organizations nonvoting membership. Overall, state Republi-








0 10 20 30 40 50
Number of State Parties
Nonvoting Membership Voting Membership
Figure 3.2: State Party Membership Status of Youth Organizations
Note: This figure displays the number of state Democratic and Republican parties that grant either
voting or nonvoting party membership to their state’s youth in politics organizations.
membership to a college group or a high school/teenage group, but Democratic parties are
more likely to grant party membership to the young Democrats than Republican parties
are to grant membership to the young Republicans. Twenty-four Republican state par-
ties grant voting party committee membership to the appropriate state federation of the
College Republicans and 8 Republican state parties grant nonvoting party committee mem-
bership to the appropriate state federation of the College Republicans. In comparison, 13
state Democratic parties grant voting committee membership the College Democrats and
1 party grants nonvoting committee membership. Eleven state Republican parties grant
voting committee membership to the Teenage Republicans and another 8 parties grant non-
voting committee membership. On the Democratic side, the High School Democrats do not
receive much representation in state Democratic parties with only 3 parties granting voting
membership. Finally, 36 state Republican parties grant committee membership, 28 voting
and 8 nonvoting, to the state federation of the Young Republicans and 39 state Democratic
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parties grant committee membership, 37 voting and 2 nonvoting, to the state federation of
the Young Democrats. In most cases, when one of these groups is granted formal party
committee membership, either the organization president or another representative from the
organization represents the organization at party meetings.
Some state political parties are so committed to increasing formal youth representation
in the party that they go beyond partnering with the Young Democrats/Republicans and
actually require a certain number of formal party members to be meet an age requirement.
For example, not only does the Idaho Republican Party grant voting membership to both
the state chapters of the Young Republicans and College Republicans, and nonvoting mem-
bership to the state chapter of the Teenage Republicans, each county elects a state youth
committee member, someone between the age of 18 and 40, to represent the county on the
state central committee. Similarly, in the Alaska Democratic Party, the party committee
from each state house district elects a Young Democrat, can be up to the age of 36, to serve
on the party’s state central committee. Given this variation in how committed each party
is to maintaining formal youth membership, Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the
number of youth committee members in each state political party with the power to vote
on party affairs.6 As seen in the table, the number of voting youth members in the Idaho
Republican Party (46) and the Alaska Democratic Party (42) are outliers and not the norm.
The mean number of voting youth members in state Democratic parties is 2.84 and mean
number of voting youth members in state Republican parties is 2.63. Moreover the median
number of voting youth committee members in state political party is one, and in almost
every case this lone youth member is a representative from one of the organizations outlined
in Figure 3.2. In order account for outliers, when I run my analysis, my main independent
variable is the number of voting youth members in each party’s state central committee
capped at 5. There are only 10 state parties with five or more voting youth members and
6I determine the number of voting youth members in each party by adding up the number of voting
members from one of the organizations outlined in Figure 3.2 and any other members explicitly identified
as youth members in the party’s bylaws.
41
only 5 state parties with more than 10 voting youth members.
Table 3.1: Voting Youth Members of State Political Parties
Mean Median Min Max SD N
Democrats 2.84 1 0 42 6.19 50
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Figure 3.3: Youth Political Participation During the 2018 General Election
Note: This figure displays a scatterplot of the percentage of individuals between the ages of 18 and
34 who were registered to vote and who voted in the 2018 general election compared to the degree of
youth diversity in the two major political party organizations in each state.
Figure 3.3 displays the relationship between the degree of youth diversity in each state
political party and two forms of youth political participation. Specifically, the y-axis displays
42
the percentage of individuals, between the ages of 18 and 34, who were registered to vote
and who actually voted in the 2018 General Election, according to the United States Census
Bureau. Unfortunately, since these measures are available at the state-level and are not
broken down by political party, it is necessary to also aggregate my measure of youth diversity
in each state political party to the state-level. As a result, the x-axis displays the number of
voting youth party members in either of the two major political parties in each state. Since,
as stated previously, my measure of youth diversity in each party committee ranges from
zero to five, the aggregated score for each state ranges from zero to ten. While this means
it is not possible to examine the theory at the party-level, Figure 3.3 should still give some
indication of whether states with youth diverse parties see higher levels of youth political
participation.
Overall, there appears to be no relationship between youth diversity in state party or-
ganizations and youth voter registration, displayed by the grey fit line, and youth voter
turnout, displayed by the black fit line. While Virginia, which is the only state where both
political parties guarantee voting committee membership to at least five youth members and
thus is the only state in Figure 3.3 to receive a score of 10, ranks high in both youth voter
registration, about 62 percent, and youth voter turnout, about 46 percent, there are states
with less youth diverse parties that saw similar rates of youth political participation. In
2018, youth voter registration on average ranged between 50 and 65 percent and youth voter
turnout ranged on average between 30 and 45 percent across each state. On average, these
estimates were stable across my measure of youth party members.
While there appears to be no relationship between party diversity and youth political
participation, even when only considering a bivariate relationship, it is possible that using
data that has been aggregated to the state level masks any true relationship. For example,
my examination of each state party’s bylaws revealed the Idaho Republican Party has made
a strong commitment to incorporating young voters into their party’s formal membership;
however, the Idaho Democratic Party’s bylaws reveal they have not done the same. As
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a result, theory would predict that young Republicans would be more politically active in
Idaho than would be young Democrats, but examining this possibility is not possible with
aggregated data. Unfortunately, data on political participation broken down by both political
party and age is difficult to collect. For example, scholars have long noted the difficulties
of measuring voting turnout during congressional primary elections (Boatright 2014, p. 85)
and doing so does not even need to consider the factor of age. Future research needs come
up with creative ways of measuring youth political participation while also considering party
identification.
Table 3.2 displays three logistic regression models which estimate whether state political
parties with more youth members are more likely to have younger nominees for Congress,
as measured by whether the nominee is up to the age of 40.7 The first column displays
the results of all observations in the aggregate, the second column displays the results for
Democratic primaries and the third column displays the results for Republican primaries.
Overall, it seems the degree of youth diversity in state political parties is only influential on
the emergence of young candidates in Democratic primaries. Specifically, as state Democratic
parties grant voting party committee membership to more youth members, their likelihood
of seeing a youth nominee increases.8 Additionally, since incumbent members of Congress
are on average older than other candidates for office, as expected, either party is more likely
to see a youth nominee in districts where there is an open seat, or in districts where the
incumbent represents the opposite party. Also in line with previous theory, I find that among
7Before running the analysis, I removed all observations for primaries where no candidates filed for office.
Additionally, I removed observations from all districts in blanket primary states where the general election
ended up being contested between two members of the same party or between a third party candidate and a
major party candidate. As seen in the appendix, I run several different iterations of this analysis and across
all of them, my findings are consistent. Specifically, I restrict my analysis to only states using traditional
partisan primaries as opposed to blanket primaries or conventions (see Table 3.3), I restrict my analysis to
only primaries where there was no party incumbent (see Table 3.4), and I restrict my analysis to remove
districts with an open seat (see Table 3.5) and the substantive results in each model are consistent.
8This finding remains even after controlling for the potential that some states may be predisposed to
seeing younger candidates for office. I replicate all of my findings three times, once while controlling for
Elazar’s state political cultures (Elazar 1994) and twice while controlling for each state’s geographic region.
Specifically, I use the geographic regions used by the Census Bureau as well as the regions used by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014). While I do not present these results for the sake of
estimating predicted probabilities later in the paper, in all three cases my findings remain consistent.
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Table 3.2: House Nominees Up To 40
All Democratic Republican




Median Voter Age −0.04 −0.04 −0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06)
Opponent Incumbent 1.66∗ 2.29∗ 1.39∗
(0.27) (0.56) (0.55)
Open Seat 1.26∗ 1.73∗ 1.17∗
(0.34) (0.57) (0.50)
Uncontested Primary −0.29 −0.43 −0.10
(0.24) (0.35) (0.37)
Convention 1.03 1.23 1.44
(0.65) (1.07) (0.95)
Woman Nominee −0.33 −0.71∗ 0.48
(0.24) (0.29) (0.44)
Trump Vote 0.02∗ 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Professionalism 1.77 1.27 3.01
(1.18) (1.69) (1.79)
Partially Closed −0.57 −0.76 −0.29
(0.54) (0.71) (0.94)
Partially Open −0.07 0.31 −0.28
(0.39) (0.54) (0.60)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters 0.19 1.00∗ −0.95
(0.39) (0.50) (0.83)
Open 0.46 0.72 0.40
(0.33) (0.45) (0.51)
Blanket −0.07 0.24 −0.20
(0.53) (0.77) (0.77)
Constant −2.96∗ −2.65 −3.15
(1.34) (1.79) (2.21)
N 788 411 377
AIC 644.30 370.02 282.04
BIC 943.15 611.14 517.97
logL −258.15 −125.01 −81.02
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Contested Primary, Closed Primary
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Democratic nominees, women are less likely than men to be a youth nominee. Finally, in
comparison to states that hold closed primary elections, Democratic parties in states with
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Figure 3.4: Predicted Probability of Nominee Up To 40
Note: This figure displays the predicted probabilities and corresponding 95 percent confidence in-
tervals of a state party organization have a youth nominee broken down by party and the degree of
youth diversity in the state party organization. All other variables are held at the medians or modes.
In order to get a better idea of the magnitude of this effect, Figure 3.4 displays the
predicted probabilities and corresponding 95 percent confidence interval of each party having
a youth nominee based upon the number of youth members given formal voting committee
membership in their party. These predictions are calculated based upon models 2 and 3 in
Table 3.2. Overall, when a state Democratic party does not guarantee voting committee
membership to any youth members, they have about a 35 percent chance of having a youth
nominee. When a state Republican party does not guarantee voting committee membership
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to any youth members, they have about a 27 percent chance of having a youth nominee.
However, as the number of voting youth members in a Democratic party increases, so does
the probability of having a youth nominee. A state Democratic party with 5 voting youth
members is predicted to have an almost 67 percent chance of having a youth nominee.
This reveals that the influence of granting voting party committee membership to young
individuals has the potential to be quite meaningful. While the confidence intervals on these
predictions are quite large since they are based on a single election cycle, this relationship
is statistically significant, as seen in Figure 3.2 and the likelihood of a Democratic youth
nominee increase by about 6 to 7 percentage for each additional youth committee member in
the party. In contrast, if anything, the likelihood of a state Republican party having a youth
nominee slightly decreases as their number of voting youth committee members increases;
although as seen in Table 3.2 this relationship is not statistically significant.
3.6 Discussion
Overall, I find state Democratic parties are more likely to grant voting party committee
membership to the Young Democrats than state Republican parties are to grant voting party
committee membership to the Young Republicans. However, state Republican parties are
more likely to grant voting party committee membership to the College Republicans or the
Teenage Republicans than state Democratic parties are to grant voting party committee
membership to College Democrats or the High School Democrats. Additionally, there is no
evidence that this variation in youth state party membership influences levels of youth voter
registration or voter turnout.
As the onset of the paper, I hoped to determine whether a lack of diversity in state polit-
ical parties contributed the under representation of young people in Congress. I found this
to be the case, albeit only among Democratic parties. Specifically, I find state Democratic
parties are more likely to have youth nominees for the House of Representatives as they
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increase the degree of youth representation in their state central committees. This finding is
meaningful because assuming these youth nominees win as often as the party’s other nom-
inees, maintaining age diversity in state Democratic party organizations can be one way to
increase youth representation in Congress.
The validity of these findings can be greatly improved upon in future research. First, this
analysis should be expanded to cover multiple election cycles and potentially even elections
for other offices. Moreover, as stated previously, new measures of political participation
that take into account both an individual’s partisan identification and their age need to
be examined. In this regard, the best path forward likely involves surveys and interviews
of members of youth political organizations such as the Young Democrats or the College
Republicans. Finally, future research should consider what drives specific state political
parties to partner with youth political organizations and/or prioritize diverse memberships
while other parties do not. Ultimately both Democratic and Republican parties should be
making more of an effort to engage and mobilize young individuals in the hope to remain
competitive in future elections.
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3.7 Appendix
Table 3.3: House Nominees Up To 40 (No Blanket Primaries or Convention States)
All Democratic Republican




Median Voter Age −0.00 −0.02 0.03
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Opponent Incumbent 1.47∗ 2.25∗ 0.95
(0.31) (0.62) (0.67)
Open Seat 1.28∗ 1.61∗ 1.51∗
(0.36) (0.62) (0.55)
Uncontested Primary −0.09 −0.29 0.21
(0.26) (0.36) (0.44)
Woman Nominee −0.35 −0.73∗ 0.75
(0.27) (0.32) (0.54)
Trump Vote 0.01 −0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Professionalism 1.57 0.28 3.52
(1.46) (1.92) (2.38)
Partially Closed −0.70 −0.92 0.71
(0.64) (0.78) (1.39)
Partially Open 0.06 0.41 −0.08
(0.40) (0.55) (0.62)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters 0.20 0.96 −0.63
(0.39) (0.50) (0.85)
Open 0.60 0.89 0.53
(0.35) (0.47) (0.56)
Constant −4.16∗ −3.02 −5.39∗
(1.54) (2.00) (2.73)
N 641 337 304
AIC 521.17 312.85 206.74
BIC 771.10 511.50 400.02
logL −204.59 −104.43 −51.37
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Closed Primary
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Table 3.4: House Nominees Up To 40 (No Races with Party Incumbents)
All Democratic Republican




Median Voter Age −0.03 −0.01 −0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08)
Open Seat −0.30 −0.57 −0.39
(0.29) (0.40) (0.60)
Uncontested Primary −0.07 −0.09 −0.03
(0.28) (0.38) (0.48)
Convention 1.30 1.37 1.43
(0.72) (1.16) (1.07)
Woman Nominee −0.47 −0.80∗ 0.43
(0.27) (0.31) (0.54)
Trump Vote 0.01 −0.00 0.03
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Professionalism 1.74 0.12 5.10∗
(1.39) (1.87) (2.52)
Partially Closed −0.07 −0.37 0.79
(0.58) (0.74) (1.05)
Partially Open 0.19 0.66 −0.41
(0.47) (0.58) (0.89)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters 0.46 1.03 −0.26
(0.46) (0.60) (0.90)
Open 0.87∗ 0.99∗ 1.18
(0.39) (0.50) (0.67)
Blanket 0.38 1.17 −0.37
(0.62) (0.86) (1.08)
Constant −1.76 −0.92 −1.07
(1.57) (2.09) (2.79)
N 424 246 178
AIC 470.67 301.03 179.37
BIC 713.66 497.33 357.55
logL −175.34 −94.51 −33.68
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Reference Categories = Contested Primary, Closed Primary
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Table 3.5: House Nominees Up To 40 (No Open Seat Races)
All Democratic Republican




Median Voter Age −0.05 −0.05 −0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
Opponent Incumbent 1.69∗ 2.47∗ 1.43∗
(0.27) (0.62) (0.59)
Uncontested Primary −0.26 −0.44 0.12
(0.26) (0.37) (0.40)
Convention 1.73∗ 2.11 2.04
(0.75) (1.24) (1.13)
Woman Nominee −0.36 −0.71∗ 0.38
(0.27) (0.32) (0.52)
Trump Vote 0.02∗ 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Professionalism 2.00 2.63 1.77
(1.35) (1.94) (1.98)
Partially Closed −0.81 −0.85 −0.99
(0.62) (0.80) (1.12)
Partially Open −0.22 0.20 −0.44
(0.44) (0.60) (0.67)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters 0.27 1.19∗ −0.91
(0.43) (0.56) (0.87)
Open 0.28 0.79 −0.21
(0.38) (0.51) (0.61)
Blanket −0.21 −0.17 −0.27
(0.59) (0.86) (0.84)
Constant −2.66 −3.04 −2.01
(1.48) (1.99) (2.44)
N 669 350 319
AIC 524.69 306.70 230.04
BIC 795.04 522.74 440.89
logL −202.35 −97.35 −59.02
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ indicates significance at p < 0.05
Reference Categories = Contested Primary, Closed Primary
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Chapter 4
Do Party Rules Matter?: An
Examination of State Party Bylaws
and Congressional Nominations
4.1 Introduction
In 2017, the Utah Republican Party changed their nomination rules with the passage
of Bylaw 8 which restricted candidates from gaining primary ballot access as a Republican
by collecting signatures. The result of this rule change is that the only way to gain ballot
access as a Republican is to win the support of delegates at the state party’s convention
(Masket 2018). Since Bylaw 8 conflicts with Utah state law, the Utah Republican Party
has had to take additional action to prevent this rule from going into effect; failing to do
so would have threatened their status as a Qualified Political Party and banned them from
state ballots altogether. Despite this, almost two years later, the state party has not been
able to fully repeal Bylaw 8, since a portion of the party’s state committee members refuse
to do so (Schott 2019). Ultimately, the party’s goal in passing, and preserving, Bylaw 8 is to
try and control which candidates will be allowed to represent the party. Though perhaps not
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as extreme in nature as Bylaw 8, many other state political parties have provision in their
bylaws, mostly concerning the party’s ability to endorse their preferred candidates, which
allow them to have a say in primary elections.
A growing wave of recent scholarship finds political parties, when defined as broad net-
works that include party donors and activists, are able to sway legislative nominations, at
both the state level (Masket 2009) and the federal level (Hassell 2018), by recruiting, en-
dorsing, and supporting their preferred candidates, while at the same time clearing the field
of other candidates. This research makes clear that broadly defined political parties are
extremely influential in primary elections even in the era of direct primaries. However, this
line of research also raises the question of whether formal political party organizations can be
just as powerful in shaping primary elections. This purpose of this paper is to consider this
question in the context of the 2018 midterm elections. Specifically, I consider whether varia-
tions in the rules governing state political parties help to explain the outcomes of primaries
for the House of Representatives.
A key factor in the success of political parties achieving their preferred electoral outcomes
is their ability to manipulate levels of competition in primary elections. I argue state political
parties can use their formal rules to influence levels of primary competitions and I theorize
that state political parties will see lower levels of competition when they have bylaws that
centralize power within the formal party organization, the state central committee. To test
this expectation, I create a new dataset of state-level party rules by collecting and coding
provisions within the bylaws of all 100 state-level Republican and Democratic parties. I
operationalize party centralization and power as whether or not elected officials are repre-
sented within each party’s formal committee membership and whether or not each party has
a neutrality policy when it comes to contested primaries. Using several different indicators
of electoral competition during primary elections, I find party power correlates with lower
levels of electoral competition, but that this trend varies by political party. Specifically, state
Democratic parties are less likely to see divisive primaries when they have rules in place al-
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lowing the state central committee to endorse their preferred candidates. Additionally, state
Republican parties are less likely to see divisive primaries and more likely to see fewer primary
candidates in general when they guarantee ex-officio party membership to their co-partisan
elected officials. Ultimately, past research reveals political parties, when defined as broad
informal networks, play an important role in shaping the outcomes of legislative elections
and this research shows that when political parties are viewed in their institutional form,
they still plan an important role in shaping the candidates who run for office and levels of
electoral competition. Together these findings have important implications on representation
in the United States.
4.2 Political Parties and Primary Elections
Recent research argues political parties should be viewed as networks of interest groups,
social groups, activists, and policy demanders working together to win elections in order
to implement their goals (Cohen, Karol, Noel & Zaller 2008, Bawn, Cohen, Karol, Masket,
Noel & Zaller 2012). Moreover, recent scholarship finds when seen as networks, political
parties are often quite successful at swaying primary elections towards their desired out-
comes at both the state and federal level. For example, at the state level, informal party
organizations, made up of officeholders, activists, donors, and other political brokers are able
to control nominations to the California Legislature by recruiting, endorsing, and funding
their preferred candidates (Masket 2009). National party networks can use their resources,
particularly financial resources, to have similar influence in congressional primary elections.
Specifically, congressional candidates are less likely to dropout out of their primary and are
more likely to perform better when they are supported by their party’s network of donors
(Desmarais, La Raja & Kowal 2015, Hassell 2018).
There are several explanations as to why party networks are able to wield such influence
in primary elections, despite the fact modern U.S. elections are often described as candidate
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centered. First, political parties play an important role in candidate recruitment (Lawless
& Fox 2010, Crowder-Meyer 2013, Broockman 2014, Karpowitz, Monson & Preece 2017).
Second, political party networks control useful electoral resources, including campaign funds,
endorsements, and political consultants, all of which are immensely beneficial when bestowed
upon candidates (Jewell & Olson 1978, Kolodny & Dulio 2003, Dominguez 2011, Benjamin
& Miller 2019).1 Moreover, despite the fact party networks can be diverse with multiple
goals, there is a high degree of collaboration among the different actors within each party
network (Kolodny & Logan 1998, Brunell 2005, Koger, Masket & Noel 2010). With this
in mind, political parties can sometimes take advantage of many voters’ lack of political
knowledge to nominate party loyalists over other more moderate candidates (Bawn et al.
2012). Finally, even when electoral reforms, such as campaign finance laws and nonpartisan
elections, are implemented political parties are not necessarily weakened because they are
capable of adapting to and working around such reforms (Masket 2016).
4.2.1 The Role of State Party Organizations
Overall, the evidence that political party networks have the ability to sway primary
elections towards their desired outcomes is convincing.2 Despite this, it is also necessary
to consider what role individual members of a party network play in this process. When
viewing political parties as networks, state central committees are just one of many actors in a
party network; however, since state central committees have immense power in shaping both
electoral and party rules in each state, they can also be viewed as independent institutions.
As a result, it is necessary to consider what role state political parties play in shaping primary
elections.
Early conventional wisdom suggested state party organizations were generally weak. In
1It should be noted when a candidate receives one of these resources, they are more likely to receive
others. For example, candidates who are endorsed by interest groups have an easier time raising money, and
candidates who raise a lot of money are also more likely to be endorsed (Hannagan, Pimlott & Littvay 2010,
Baker 2016).
2These arguments also align with Steve Laffey’s personal account of challenging Lincoln Chafee in the
2006 Republican Primary for one of Rhode Island’s U.S. Senate seats (Laffey 2007).
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the 1960s, there were relatively few strong state party organizations (Mayhew 1986). De-
spite this, more recent research suggests these claims were overstated and if anything party
organizations have been on the rebound since the 1960s and 1970s (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby
& Huckshorn 1984, Kayden & Mahe Jr 1985). The resurgence of party organizations has
been driven by increased resources and professionalization among party staff (Kayden &
Mahe Jr 1985), and the most powerful party organizations are described as long lasting,
autonomous, internally hierarchical with specialization among staff, interested in bringing
about the nominations of candidates for a wide range of public offices, reliant on material
incentives in carrying out their work, and resource rich (Cotter et al. 1984, Mayhew 1986).
Overall, state political parties, and their local subsidiaries, are important in modern elections
because among other things, they recruit candidates and provide both technical services and
financial support (Frendreis, Gibson & Vertz 1990, Brox 2004, Bekafigo, Cohen, Gainous &
Wagner 2013, Crowder-Meyer 2013, Preece & Stoddard 2015).3
4.3 Theory
Overall, there is good reason to believe powerful state party organizations are able to
sway primary elections. This is mainly due to the fact they play an important role in shaping
the electoral environment through their party rules. For the most part, state Democratic
and Republican parties can control who is allowed to vote in their primaries, when the party
can endorse candidates, which candidates receive financial support from the party, and when
party rules can be changed. Moreover, since state and local party organizations both play
an important role in candidate recruitment and often serve as a pool of potential candidates
for elected office (Niven 1998, Lawless & Fox 2010, Crowder-Meyer 2013), it is likely party
rules concerning party membership qualifications play a role in influencing primary elections.
Ultimately, this makes state party rules an important indicator of political party strength.
3It is also worth noting that broad party networks exist at the state level as well as the national level
(Reuning 2019). It is likely state party organizations can partner with their allies in these broader networks
to work towards their goals.
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However, with the exception of primary type, the rules of state and local political parties
have received less scholarly attention than the national party rules that governor presidential
primary elections (Kanthak & Morton 2001). Of course, not all of the rules governing state
political parties are meaningful in regard to primary elections. However, there are several
that likely go a long way in explaining state party strength and correspondingly the ability
of state parties to reduce competition in an attempt to sway primary elections towards their
desired outcomes.
First, many state central committees have rules pertaining to whether the party organi-
zation is allowed to take sides during contested primary elections. Some state parties allow
the state central committee, or the corresponding county or local party committee, to en-
dorse their preferred candidates in contested primary elections, but other parties require the
state central committee to maintain neutrality until after a party nominee is elected in a
primary election. Many times, party organizations that maintain neutrality during contested
primaries also have rules forbidding party resources from being used or distributed in favor of
one candidate over another, or rules stating party resources can only be used or distributed
equally among primary candidates.
While having a party maintain neutrality during contested primary elections supports
the notion of free and open elections and as a result, may be desirable for a healthy democ-
racy, doing so likely inhibits a political party’s ability to reduce competition and sway
primary elections towards their desired outcomes. The main reason for this is endorse-
ments, especially those from the state or local party, are beneficial to primary candidates
(Jewell 1984, Morehouse 1990, Herrnson & Gimpel 1995, Jewell & Morehouse 2001, Kousser,
Lucas, Masket & McGhee 2015). This is especially true in states where a party endorsement
comes with other benefits such as the candidate receiving a special distinction or preferred
placement on the primary ballot (Jewell & Olson 1978). In fact, most primary candidates
seek the endorsement of the party organization and believe the party’s endorsement will have
a meaningful impact on the outcome of the primary.
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Clearly the benefits associated with receiving a party endorsement are meaningful, but
the implications of party rules permitting endorsements go beyond one candidate receiving
the advantage of party support. If a party organization is allowed to throw their support and
resources behind their preferred candidate, and have a history of doing so, some potential
candidates may be less likely to run for office (Herrnson & Gimpel 1995). This is especially
true if they do not anticipate receiving an endorsement and support from the party. In fact,
the perceived lack of support from the party organization is one of the reasons more women
do not run for elected office (Niven 1998, Butler & Preece 2016). Ultimately, the decision
to run for elected office is a cost-benefit analysis and candidates decide to run for office
when the potential benefits and likelihood of winning the election outweigh the potential
costs of running and losing (Lazarus 2008). From this perspective, it seems like the costs
associated with running for office are higher in states where parties select favorites during a
primary election in comparison to state where parties maintain neutrality during contested
primaries. Of course, a candidate who wins the endorsement of their party would see an
improvement to their likelihood of winning, but since political parties want to win office and
therefore have an incentive to endorse the candidate with the best likelihood of winning, it
seems the only candidates who can be confident of receiving party support are incumbents
and candidates personally recruited by the party to run. Between the advantages associated
with a party endorsement and the potential that a party’s lack of neutrality may scare off
other candidates, endorsements seem like an ideal way for state central committees to reduce
primary competition. This leads to my first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: State political parties mandating neutrality during contested primary elec-
tions will see more competitive primary elections.
Beyond whether a state political party endorses candidates or maintains neutrality during
contested primary elections, state parties also vary in regard to whether they consider their
co-partisan elected officials to be automatic members of the state central committee. Some
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state political parties allow their elected officials to heavily influence the decisions of the state
central committee by granting them voting rights in the party and other political parties
only allow their elected officials to have membership on the state central committee if they
are elected to party office like any other party member. Since elected officials are already
important players in informal party networks (Masket 2009), parties with rules ensuring the
representation of elected officials in the formal proceedings of the state central committee are
highly centralized and as a result, likely better able to control primary elections by reducing
competition.
Mayhew famously identified winning reelection as the proximate goal of all members of
Congress and the same could be said of other elected officials (Mayhew 1974). Moreover,
many elected officials, including those who face term limits at the state level (Steen 2006),
possess progressive ambition (Schlesinger 1966). Ultimately, since politicians act in a man-
ner that coincides with their electoral goals, parties that are largely comprised of career
politicians and elected officials likely also act to preserve and extend the political careers of
their members. Since state central committees are the governing bodies of political parties,
elected officials with voting membership in these institutions have both the motivation and
means to govern party affairs in a manner which supports their own personal interests. For
example the rules of the Nebraska Republican Party state incumbents are the only candi-
dates allowed to be endorsed by the state central committee during a contested primary
election.4 Similarly, while not a written rule, some state political parties have a tradition
of allowing their co-partisan state governor to either formally or informally recommend a
preferred candidate for party chair (Jewell & Olson 1978). More broadly, even if a party
organization, led by elected officials, does not implement policies that explicitly advantage
incumbent officeholders, they still provide the officials in question the opportunity to vote
on the party platform and other matters before the party that might implicitly aid their own
goals.
4Ironically, the Nebraska Republican Party does not grant their co-partisan elected officials ex-officio
party membership.
59
Additionally, since as stated previously, formal party organizations often serve as a point
of candidate recruitment for broader party networks (Niven 1998, Lawless & Fox 2010,
Crowder-Meyer 2013), state parties that guarantee ex-officio membership to their elected
officials likely make it easier for politicians serving in state or local government to act on
progressive ambition. If a state party is comprised of individuals willing and eager to run for
other elected offices, they may be less likely to actively recruit candidates from outside the
party organization and local elected offices.5 In fact, politically ambitious individuals may
initially run for party office in the hopes it will serve as a springboard for other public office.
Overall, political parties that allow elected officials to be important players both within the
formal party structure and the broader party network perfectly embody the view of political
parties as endogenous institutions that are continually altered to meet the needs of ambitious
politicians (Aldrich 2011). As a result, my second hypothesis is as follows.
Hypothesis 2: State political parties guaranteeing party membership to their co-partisan
elected officials will see less competitive primary elections.
4.4 Data and Methodology
In order to evaluate my theory that party rules help state party organizations to sway
levels of election competition in primary elections, I collected and coded the state party
bylaws of all 100 state Democratic and Republican parties. Additionally, I collected data
pertaining to primary competition for all primary elections for the House of Representatives
during 2018 midterm elections.6
5This would be particularly harmful to potential women and minority candidates who are less likely to
be found in the traditional party network (Niven 1998, Lawless & Fox 2010, Crowder-Meyer 2013).
6Since political parties need to follow different rules, and as a result may be driven by different incentives,
primary elections taking place in states, California, Louisiana, and Washington, using blanket primaries and
states, Connecticut, Utah, and Virginia, where party conventions are sometimes used are not included in
this analysis.
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Figure 4.1: Endorsement Policies of State Political Parties
Note: This figure displays the endorsement policies of state political parties across the country
according to their bylaws.
In the forthcoming analysis, I use the two party rules previously discussed, whether
each state party mandates neutrality during contested primary elections and whether each
state party grants ex-officio state party committee membership to their co-partisan elected
officials, as my main independent variables conceptualizing party power. Figure 4.1 displays
the endorsement policies of each state Democratic and Republican Party. Specifically, based
upon each party’s bylaws, each party was coded as either allowing pre-primary endorsements,
requiring neutrality from the party organization during contested primary elections, or being
silent on the manner, which means their bylaws neither outlined a policy for endorsing
primary candidates, nor did they mandate neutrality during primary elections. Overall,
a similar number of Democratic and Republican parties fell into each of these categories;
although, there are several instances of parties within the same state having a different policy
concerning pre-primary endorsements. Overall, 14 state Democratic parties and 13 state
Republican parties required neutrality from the party organization during the 2018 primary
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elections. In contrast, 16 Democratic state parties and 16 Republican state parties had rules
that allowed for pre-primary endorsements in 2018. The remaining 20 Democratic state
parties and 21 Republican state parties had bylaws in place that neither forbid endorsements
nor required party neutrality. In the forthcoming analysis, I assume that if a state party does
not explicitly forbid pre-primary endorsements, the party in question can endorse a primary
candidate if they decide to do so. This is important because even if a party that is silent
on the matter has a norm of primary neutrality, norms are easier to circumvent or overturn
than are rules written into the party bylaws. As a result, I collapse these three categories
in order to make the distinction between the 27 parties that mandate neutrality and the 73
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Figure 4.2: Representation of Elected Officials in State Political Parties
Note: This figure displays the membership status of co-partisan elected officials in state political
parties across the country according to party bylaws.
Figure 4.2 displays the number of state parties that guarantee ex-officio party committee
membership to their elected officials.7 As with state party primary endorsement policies,
7It is important to note that by ex-officio party membership I mean the officials granted party committee
membership by nature of holding another office. For example, a governor being granted membership to a
state party because they are the sitting governor is an ex-officio member, but a governor who won party
committee membership by running for party office like any other elected party committee member is not an
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Democratic and Republican parties are similar in regard to their practice of granting ex-
officio committee membership to their allied officeholders. There is a slight tendency of
Democratic parties being more likely to give their ex-officio members the right to vote on
matters before the party. Specifically, 32 state Democratic parties guarantee voting party
committee membership to their elected officials, 4 grant nonvoting committee membership,
and 14 grant no form of ex-officio party committee membership. On the Republican side,
29 state parties guarantee voting committee membership to their allied elected official, 5
grant nonvoting committee membership, and 16 do not grant any form of party committee
membership. In Figure 4.2, parties are classified as granting voting party committee mem-
bership to their elected officials if at least one elected official is granted voting membership,
but in reality if a state political party grants party committee membership to one elected
official, they are likely to grant party committee membership to several elected officials. For
example, 19 state Democratic parties and 18 state Republican parties guarantee some degree
of voting party committee membership to co-partisans when they hold the office of governor,
state house, state senate, U.S. House, U.S. Senate, and state constitutional offices.8 Since
this is the case, in the forthcoming analysis, I use a binary measure of whether or not each
state party guarantees voting party committee membership to at least one fellow partisan
elected official, as seen in Figure 4.2, to measure this dimension of party power.
4.4.2 Measuring Party Influence in the 2018 Midterm Elections
Overall, there are several ways to measure a political party’s ability to sway primary
elections towards lower levels of competition. Probably the most obvious indicator of party
strength during primary elections is the absence of a primary election. The idea here is
that a party might be able to avoid holding a true primary election by centralizing support
ex-officio member. Due to data limitations, it is not possible to determine the number of elected officials
who won state party committee membership through a party election, but it is possible to use party bylaws
to determine whether they guarantee ex-officio membership to their fellow partisans.
8In some cases, these individuals, or the party delegation in the legislative chamber collectively, name a
representative to serve on the party on their behalf opposed to personally voting on party affairs, but in all
cases, the co-partisans serving in these positions have some degree of voting representation in party affairs.
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around a single candidate. Thus, a binary measure of whether or not each primary is
uncontested will serve as my first dependent variable measuring party control, with the
expectation that powerful parties will see a greater number of uncontested primaries. In
contrast to uncontested primaries, one indicator that a political party has lost control of
the nomination process is the occurrence of a divisive primary. Although empirical evidence
surrounding the concern is mixed, political parties want to avoid divisive primaries because
they fear a divisive primary will weaken the party’s nominee in the general election or even
the party as a whole in future election cycles (Hacker 1965, Johnson & Gibson 1974, Piereson
& Smith 1975, Born 1981, Romero 2003). Since parties want to avoid divisive primaries and
the occurrence of a divisive primary indicates the inability of a party to minimize primary
competition, my second dependent variable is a binary measure of whether or not each
primary election is divisive. Here, I consider a primary to be divisive if the primary winner’s
margin of victory is less than or equal to 20% (Bernstein 1977) and I expect strong political
parties will see fewer divisive primaries.910 Finally, since uncontested primaries and divisive
primaries are the extreme ends of the spectrum in regard to levels of competition in primary
elections, I use the total number of candidates in each primary as a third and final dependent
variable with the expectation that strong political parties will on average see fewer candidates
than weaker political parties. Table 4.1 displays summary statistics for each of my dependent
variables.
Since many factors contribute to primary elections outcomes, it is also necessary to
consider other factors that may influence how much control a party has over the primary
9It is worth noting that much of the existing research on divisive primaries struggles to clearly distinguish
the differences between divisiveness and competitiveness (Djupe & Peterson 2002, Jewitt & Treul 2014).
Unfortunately many of these alternative measures of divisiveness are not transferable to other election cycles
due to either their theoretical underpinnings or data limitations. Nonetheless, at the very least, the measure
used in this paper considers primary competition even if it is not a perfect measure of divisiveness (Jewitt
& Treul 2014).
10Table 4.6 replicates my results when a primary is considered to be divisive when the winner’s margin
of victory was less than or equal to 30% (Piereson & Smith 1975). Using this less stringent measure
of divisiveness, I find Republican parties saw fewer divisive primaries when they granted ex-officio party
committee membership to their elected officials, but surprisingly were also less likely to see divisive primaries
when they implemented policies requiring neutrality during contested primaries. In Democratic primaries,
party power had no influence on primary divisiveness.
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election process. First, in order to consider the powers associated with incumbency, I consider
whether there was a party incumbent, an opponent incumbent, or an open seat, according
to the perspective of each political party in each district. In order to consider the ideological
leanings of each district, I control for Trump’s 2016 voteshare during the 2016 presidential
election (Nir 2012). Since some districts favor Democrats and others favor Republicans, I
use the Cook Report from November 7, 2017 to create a binary classification as to whether
each district was expected to be competitive during the general election (The Cook Political
Report 2017).11 I also control for each state’s degree of legislative professionalism using the
Squire Index (Squire 2017) and the type primary held in each state according to the National
Conference of State Legislatures (National Conference of State Legislatures 2016). Finally, I
use Elazar’s conceptualization of political culture (Elazar 1994) in order to consider whether
there were any trends are driven by political culture in 2018 (Craig 2016).








Continuous DV Mean Median Min Max
Number of Candidates
Democratic 2.64 2 1 11
Republican 2.29 2 1 18
Democratic N = 343, Republican N = 319
11A district was coded as competitive if the Cook Report classified it as either likely, lean, or toss-up in
favor of either party. I selected to make this determination based upon the November 7, 2017 report because
it was the closest report to the first filing deadlines of the 2018 election cycle.
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4.5 Results
Table 4.2 displays six logit models estimating uncontested primaries during the 2018
congressional midterm elections. Since my two measures of state party power are related
and partially correlated, it is necessary to estimate their influence independently in separate
models to avoid potential multicollinearity bias. The first three models estimate the likeli-
hood of an uncontested primary using each state party’s endorsement policy as my measure
of party power and models four through six estimate the likelihood of an uncontested pri-
mary using the status of co-partisan elected officials in each state party as my measure of
party power. With both sets of models, I run analysis on each political party independently
and all primaries in the aggregate. Other than my two different measures of party power,
all other variables in each model are the same with the exception of an additional binary
variable used to indicate Democratic primaries in my two aggregate models. Analysis of my
other dependent variables, the likelihood of a divisive primary and the number of primary
candidates, will be presented in the same manner in additional tables.
Overall, neither state Democratic parties, nor state Republican parties, seem to be able
to increase the number of uncontested primaries through their party rules. State parties that
permit pre-primary endorsements are no more likely to see uncontested primaries than are
state parties that mandate pre-primary neutrality. Additionally, state parties that guarantee
party committee membership to their co-partisan elected officials are not more likely to see
uncontested primary than are state parties that do not grant party committee membership
to their elected officials.
Beyond state party power, in 2018, Democratic primaries were less likely to be uncon-
tested than Republican primaries. This is probably the result of there being more Republican
controlled seats in the House of Representatives entering 2018 and the fact that the electoral
environment in 2018 was seen as favoring Democrats. In line with what is known about the
power of incumbency, all primaries elections were less likely to be uncontested when they
took place in a district with an open seat and Democratic primaries were less likely to be
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Table 4.2: Likelihood of an Uncontested Primary
Endorsement Policy Elected Officials
All Dem Rep All Dem Rep
Required Neutrality 0.33 0.32 0.27
(0.23) (0.35) (0.35)
Officials 0.31 −0.11 0.43
(0.20) (0.29) (0.38)
Democratic Primary −0.67∗∗∗ −0.68∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.17)
Opponent Incumbent −0.59∗∗ −2.62∗∗∗ −0.35 −0.63∗∗∗ −2.64∗∗∗ −0.36
(0.18) (0.46) (0.42) (0.19) (0.46) (0.42)
Open Seat −1.66∗∗∗ −2.80∗∗∗ −1.79∗∗∗ −1.70∗∗∗ −2.85∗∗∗ −1.82∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.53) (0.42) (0.29) (0.53) (0.42)
Trump Vote −0.66 4.42∗∗∗ −1.14 −0.68 4.53∗∗∗ −1.18
(0.56) (1.28) (1.22) (0.56) (1.28) (1.22)
Competitive District −0.27 0.03 −0.39 −0.27 0.01 −0.42
(0.23) (0.37) (0.32) (0.23) (0.37) (0.32)
Professionalism 3.90∗∗ 2.54 6.88∗∗∗ 3.86∗∗ 2.01 6.72∗∗∗
(1.23) (1.84) (1.86) (1.22) (1.83) (1.82)
Partially Closed −0.76† −0.53 −0.70 −0.74† −0.53 −0.63
(0.43) (0.71) (0.56) (0.42) (0.71) (0.55)
Partially Open −0.31 −0.02 −0.47 −0.13 −0.01 −0.03
(0.28) (0.43) (0.40) (0.30) (0.43) (0.53)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters 0.31 0.23 0.49 0.39 0.28 0.62
(0.29) (0.42) (0.42) (0.29) (0.42) (0.44)
Open 0.16 0.60 0.01 0.33 0.62 0.30
(0.25) (0.37) (0.36) (0.27) (0.38) (0.45)
Individualistic −0.25 −0.26 −0.43 −0.28 −0.25 −0.53
(0.27) (0.40) (0.40) (0.27) (0.41) (0.39)
Moralistic 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.15 0.15
(0.27) (0.39) (0.39) (0.27) (0.40) (0.40)
Constant −0.28 −2.13∗∗ −0.72 −0.40 −1.93∗ −0.94
(0.49) (0.76) (1.00) (0.51) (0.79) (1.04)
N 662 343 319 662 343 319
AIC 828.21 397.18 417.90 827.85 397.86 417.16
BIC 1079.94 596.74 613.69 1079.59 597.43 612.95
logL −358.10 −146.59 −156.95 −357.93 −146.93 −156.58
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Closed Primary, Traditionalistic
uncontested when taking place in a district with a Republican incumbent. In comparison,
Republican primaries were no more likely to be uncontested in districts where there was
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a Democratic incumbent compared to a Republican incumbent. Additionally, Democratic
primaries were more likely to be uncontested in districts where Trump performed well in
2016 probably because these districts appeared to be unwinnable to many potential Demo-
cratic candidates. Similarly, Republican primaries were more likely to be uncontested in
states with a higher level of legislative professionalism probably as a result of there being
one strong candidate seeking the nomination in many districts. Finally, district competitive-
ness, primary type, nor state political culture had a significant influence on the frequency of
uncontested primaries.
Table 4.3 displays the results of logits models estimating the likelihood of divisive pri-
maries during the 2018 midterm elections. Unlike their inability to increase the number of
uncontested primaries, powerful state political parties appear to have some ability to limit
the number of divisive primaries through provisions in their bylaws. However, each party
has a different strategy for doing so. State Democratic parties that permitted pre-primary
endorsements were less likely to see divisive primaries than were state Democratic parties
that mandated neutrality during contested primary elections, but the status of co-partisan
elected officials within state Democratic parties had no influence on the likelihood of divi-
sive primaries. In contrast, state Republican parties were less likely to see divisive primary
elections when they guaranteed ex-officio party committee membership to their co-partisan
elected officials, but were unable to reduce the number of divisive primaries by allowing
pre-primary endorsements.12 The trend of both political parties being able to limit the
number of divisive primaries, but not increase the number of uncontested primaries is likely
explained by the fact political parties have more of an incentive to avoid divisive primaries
than contested primaries. First, a contested primary does not always translate to a com-
12The analysis presented in Table 4.3 includes all primary elections including those that were uncontested.
By definition, uncontested primaries are not divisive and as a result are coded as such. Table 4.5 in the
Appendix replicates this analysis when the sample is restricted to contested primary elections, thus estimat-
ing the likelihood of a divisive primary conditional on there being a contested primary. The finding that
Democratic primaries are more likely to be divisive when a state party mandates neutrality holds when using
this restricted sample, but the finding that Republican primaries are less likely to be divisive when a state
party grants ex-officio committee membership to their elected officials does not.
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Table 4.3: Likelihood of a Divisive Primary
Endorsement Policy Elected Officials
All Dem Rep All Dem Rep
Required Neutrality 0.37 0.86∗ −0.65
(0.28) (0.38) (0.52)
Officials −0.50∗ 0.00 −1.28∗
(0.23) (0.31) (0.52)
Democratic Primary 0.12 0.08
(0.22) (0.22)
Opponent Incumbent 2.21∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 2.46∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 2.51∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.64) (0.59) (0.31) (0.62) (0.60)
Open Seat 2.85∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 3.22∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗
(0.34) (0.62) (0.51) (0.34) (0.59) (0.52)
Trump Vote −0.29 −2.22 −0.51 −0.19 −1.78 −0.20
(0.74) (1.42) (1.52) (0.75) (1.38) (1.55)
Competitive District 0.21 −0.43 1.11∗ 0.22 −0.43 1.23∗∗
(0.26) (0.36) (0.44) (0.26) (0.36) (0.45)
Professionalism −1.52 0.49 −5.94∗ −2.48† −0.80 −5.13∗
(1.47) (1.98) (2.50) (1.44) (1.97) (2.45)
Partially Closed 0.03 −0.27 0.90 0.03 −0.37 0.73
(0.46) (0.63) (0.75) (0.47) (0.62) (0.76)
Partially Open −0.09 −0.64 0.65 −0.30 −0.65 −0.51
(0.33) (0.47) (0.51) (0.35) (0.47) (0.66)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters −0.26 −0.15 −0.48 −0.35 −0.13 −0.69
(0.35) (0.48) (0.56) (0.35) (0.48) (0.58)
Open −0.20 −0.14 −0.62 −0.44 −0.02 −1.35∗
(0.30) (0.40) (0.52) (0.33) (0.41) (0.63)
Individualistic 0.24 0.56 −0.35 0.19 0.64 −0.09
(0.31) (0.43) (0.53) (0.31) (0.42) (0.51)
Moralistic −0.33 0.20 −1.28∗ −0.24 0.12 −1.11†
(0.32) (0.42) (0.58) (0.32) (0.42) (0.59)
Constant −2.57∗∗∗ −2.78∗∗ −1.22 −1.93∗∗ −2.41∗ −0.83
(0.65) (0.92) (1.30) (0.66) (0.95) (1.33)
N 662 343 319 662 343 319
AIC 610.32 350.55 253.11 607.40 355.52 248.36
BIC 862.06 550.12 448.90 859.13 555.08 444.15
logL −249.16 −123.28 −74.55 −247.70 −125.76 −72.18
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Closed Primary, Traditionalistic
petitive primary as many congressional candidates, especially amateur candidates, are often
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seen as hopeless.13 Moreover, political parties may be criticized if they are seen as stifling
all competition, which means their rules may only be intended to limit the most serious
competition opposed to eliminating all competition. The trend of each party being able
to sway nominations by using different rules is more difficult to explain, but one potential
explanation is that many divisive primaries, especially on the Republican side, are driven
by ideological primary challengers (Boatright 2013). As a result, elected officials voting on
all party affairs may be more meaningful at deterring ideological primary challengers than
the potential of an ideological challenger running against a candidate endorsed by the party
organization.
Not surprisingly, during both Democratic and Republican primaries, divisive primaries
were more common in districts with an open seat or an opponent incumbent than a party
incumbent. Additionally, divisive Republican primaries are more likely in districts that were
expected to be competitive in the general election but were less likely in Moralistic states
and states with high levels of legislative professionalism. No other factors contributed to the
likelihood of a divisive Democratic primary.
In order to determine the magnitude of these effects, Figure 4.3 displays the predicted
probability of a divisive primary broken down by party and my two measures of party
power. The top panel displays predictions based upon state parties’ endorsement policies
and the bottom panel displays predictions based upon the status of co-partisan elected
officials in state parties. Whether a state Republican party permits party endorsement(s) or
requires neutrality during contested primaries has minimal influence on the probability of a
divisive primary. Specifically, state Republican parties permitting party endorsements during
contested primary elections had a 0.26 probability (0.10 to 0.50) of having a divisive primary
and state Republican parties requiring the state central committee to maintain neutrality
during contested primary elections had a 0.15 probability (0.04 to 0.42) of having a divisive
primary. In comparison, state Democratic parties permitting party endorsements had a 0.32
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Figure 4.3: Predicted Probability of a Divisive Primary
Note: This figure displays the predicted probability of a divisive primary during 2018 midterm
elections broken down by political party and my two measures of party power. The top panel displays
predictions based upon state parties’ endorsement policies and are calculated using models 2 and 3 in
Table 4.3. The bottom panel displays predictions based upon the status of co-partisan elected officials
in state parties and are calculated using models 5 and 6 in Table 4.3. In both sets of predictions, all
other variables held at their median or mode.
probability (0.20 to 0.47) of having a divisive primary, but state Democratic parties requiring
neutrality had a 0.52 probability (0.33 to 0.71) of having a divisive primary. Overall, in 2018,
state Democratic parties requiring neutrality had a 0.20 greater probability of seeing divisive
primaries than state Democratic parties permitting endorsements. Together, the evidence
presented in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.3 indicates the relationship between state Democratic
parties’ endorsement policies and the frequency of divisive primaries is both statistically and
substantively significant.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.3 shows among state Democratic parties, the probability
of having a divisive primary does not change based upon the status of co-partisan elected
officials in each party. State Democratic parties granting ex-officio voting party committee
membership to elected officials had a 0.37 probability (0.22 to 0.54) of having a divisive pri-
71
mary and Democratic parties not guaranteeing party committee membership to their elected
officials had a 0.37 probability (0.24 to 0.52) of having a divisive primary. During Republican
primaries, state parties ensuring elected officials had party committee membership had a 0.09
probability (0.03 to 0.29) of having a divisive primary and state parties not guaranteeing
party committee membership to their elected officials had a 0.27 probability (0.12 to 0.51)
of having a divisive primary. These findings indicate Republican state parties could reduce
the probability of having a divisive primary by about 0.18 if they were pass rules ensuring
their elected officials had greater representation in party affairs.
Finally, Table 4.4 displays Poisson models estimating the number of primary candidates
during the 2018 congressional midterm elections. Powerful state Democratic parties do not
have the ability to limit the number of primary candidates either by permitting pre-primary
endorsements or by granting ex-officio party committee membership to co-partisan elected
officials. In contrast, state Republican parties guaranteeing representation of their elected
official in party affairs see fewer primary candidates on average than state Republican parties
that do not guarantee party representation for their elected officials.
Mirroring trends seen in the previous models, more Democrats and Republicans ran for
the House of Representative in districts where there is an open seat, or an opponent incum-
bent compared to a party incumbent. Additionally, given the electoral environment in 2018,
more Democrats than Republicans ran for Congress, but there were fewer Democratic candi-
dates in district where Trump performed well in 2016. In both Democratic and Republican
primaries, fewer candidates ran in states witch high levels of legislative professionalism. In
regard to state political culture, the number of Democrats running for the House was greater
in individualistic states compared to traditionalistic states. Finally, primary type had no
influence on the number of candidates running for the House of Representatives in primaries
for either party.
Figure 4.3 displays predicted counts of the number of primary candidates broken down by
political party and the status of co-partisan elected officials in state parties. The predicted
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Table 4.4: Estimated Number of Primary Candidates
Endorsement Policy Elected Officials
All Dem Rep All Dem Rep
Required Neutrality −0.06 0.02 −0.16
(0.07) (0.11) (0.12)
Officials −0.17∗∗ −0.05 −0.26∗
(0.06) (0.08) (0.12)
Democratic Primary 0.10∗ 0.10∗
(0.05) (0.05)
Opponent Incumbent 0.27∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.11∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15)
Open Seat 0.88∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.81∗∗∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.14) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) (0.11)
Trump Vote 0.02 −1.82∗∗∗ 0.66† 0.02 −1.80∗∗∗ 0.70†
(0.17) (0.34) (0.39) (0.17) (0.33) (0.39)
Competitive District 0.16∗ 0.13 0.08 0.17∗∗ 0.13 0.11
(0.06) (0.09) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.11)
Professionalism −1.31∗∗∗ −1.34∗∗ −2.59∗∗∗ −1.40∗∗∗ −1.44∗∗ −2.46∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.51) (0.60) (0.34) (0.51) (0.58)
Partially Closed 0.17 0.10 0.28 0.17 0.10 0.22
(0.11) (0.16) (0.19) (0.11) (0.16) (0.20)
Partially Open 0.08 −0.01 0.16 −0.00 −0.02 −0.09
(0.08) (0.12) (0.14) (0.09) (0.12) (0.17)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters −0.09 −0.16 −0.04 −0.12 −0.17 −0.10
(0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.13) (0.15)
Open 0.06 −0.03 0.11 −0.03 −0.04 −0.02
(0.07) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.15)
Individualistic 0.15∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.04 0.15† 0.30∗∗ 0.12
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Moralistic −0.10 −0.06 −0.23† −0.06 −0.05 −0.19
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.13)
Constant 0.77∗∗∗ 0.48∗ −0.03 0.90∗∗∗ 0.54∗ 0.05
(0.15) (0.23) (0.34) (0.16) (0.24) (0.34)
N 662 343 319 662 343 319
AIC 2321.62 1129.50 1012.06 2313.41 1129.24 1009.27
BIC 2573.35 1329.06 1207.85 2565.15 1328.80 1205.06
logL −1104.81 −512.75 −454.03 −1100.71 −512.62 −452.64
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Closed Primary, Traditionalistic
number of primary candidates does not significantly vary regardless of whether state Demo-
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Figure 4.4: Predicted Count of Primary Candidates
Note: This figure displays the predicted count of primary candidates during 2018 midterm elections
broken down by political party and status of co-partisan elected officials in state political parties.
Predictions are calculated using models 5 and 6 in Table 4.4 with all other variables held at their
median or mode.
Democratic parties ensuring their elected officials are represented in party affairs can expect
to see about 2.7 candidates (2.2 to 3.2) in each primary and state Democratic parties not
ensuring the representation of their elected officials can expect to see about 2.8 candidates
(2.4 to 3.3) in each primary. On the other hand, state Republican parties can expect to
see the average number of candidates in each primary decrease by a little more than half
a candidate when their elected officials are granted ex-officio party committee membership.
Specifically, state Republican parties granting party committee membership to their elected
officials on average see 1.9 candidates (1.4 to 2.7) in each primary, while state Republican
parties not granting party committee membership to their elected officials on average see 2.5
candidates (1.9 to 3.3) per primary.
4.6 Discussion
Previous scholarship argues broad political party networks are able to sway primary
elections towards their desired outcomes. Building off this research, the findings presented
in this paper reveal state political party organizations, key actors within broader party
networks, are able to use their party rules to influence levels of competition in primary
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elections. However, state Democratic parties and state Republican parties use different
tactics to influence the outcomes of their primaries. Specifically, Democratic parties tend
to see fewer divisive primaries when they allow the state central committee to make pre-
primary endorsements; while, Republican parties tend to see fewer divisive primaries, and
fewer primary candidates in general, when their elected officials are ensured representation
within the formal party organization. In contrast, neither party has had much success in
using their rules to increase the number of uncontested primaries. This is likely the result of
state parties having greater incentive to avoid divisive primaries than to eliminate primary
competition altogether.
Ultimately, when these findings are considered in conjunction with other scholarship the
normative question of whether it is desirable to have strong political party organizations is
raised. First, it is possible that strong state political parties are biased against non-traditional
candidates in more ways than one. Strong evidence already suggests biases in the candidate
recruitment process contribute to fewer women running for elected office (Niven 1998, Lawless
& Fox 2010, Crowder-Meyer 2013). However, since greater party control of primary elections
probably advantages incumbents and politicians in other elected offices, more so than other
candidates, it seems possible that party rules are another source of bias against women and
minority candidates. Similarly, party elites are more likely than voters to favor political
ideologues as their nominees (Broockman, Carnes, Crowder-Meyer & Skovron 2019). This
means strong state parties may indirectly contribute to political polarization.
Finally, the findings presented here also create questions for future research. First, the
analysis presented in this paper should be replicated across both future election cycles and
elections for other offices to increase the external validity of these findings.14 Additionally,
future research should consider whether, and if so how, broader political party networks
14In particular, there may be a regional component at play in Republican primaries. When I replicate my
analysis while controlling for geographic region instead of state political culture, I still find a relationship
between strong state parties and party control of primary elections, but the mechanism at play was a party’s
endorsement policy opposed to the status of the party’s co-partisan elected officials. Future longitudinal
analysis will allow me to use a better identification strategy, state fixed effects, and will help me to better
understand the casual mechanism at play.
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act differently depending upon the party rules in place in each state. For example, if a
state party organization requires the state central committee to maintain neutrality during
a contested primary election, which this paper shows increases the likelihood of divisive
Democratic primaries, it is possible members of the informal party network compensate by
working harder behind the senses to aid their preferred candidates and achieve party goals.
Overall, coupling the research presented here with the existing research on broader political




Table 4.5: Likelihood of a Divisive Primary Conditional of Being a Contested Primary
Endorsement Policy Elected Officials
All Dem Rep All Dem Rep
Required Neutrality 0.95∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 0.12
(0.33) (0.44) (0.59)
Officials −0.25 0.09 −0.81
(0.26) (0.33) (0.59)
Democratic Primary −0.48† −0.48†
(0.26) (0.26)
Opponent Incumbent 2.52∗∗∗ 2.55∗∗∗ 2.84∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗ 2.29∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.70) (0.75) (0.34) (0.66) (0.75)
Open Seat 2.74∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗ 2.50∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.67) (0.58) (0.36) (0.63) (0.57)
Trump Vote −1.05 −0.57 −1.85 −0.82 −0.03 −1.79
(0.88) (1.52) (2.02) (0.86) (1.48) (2.06)
Competitive District −0.14 −0.55 0.77 −0.12 −0.50 0.95†
(0.29) (0.39) (0.52) (0.29) (0.38) (0.53)
Professionalism 1.26 0.91 −1.34 −0.24 −0.42 −1.37
(1.64) (2.08) (3.03) (1.60) (2.05) (2.96)
Partially Closed −0.14 −0.41 0.78 −0.22 −0.62 0.80
(0.49) (0.65) (0.84) (0.49) (0.65) (0.86)
Partially Open −0.34 −1.00∗ 0.73 −0.38 −0.97† 0.13
(0.37) (0.51) (0.66) (0.38) (0.50) (0.80)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters −0.10 −0.19 −0.33 −0.10 −0.09 −0.47
(0.40) (0.51) (0.68) (0.40) (0.51) (0.70)
Open −0.19 0.03 −0.75 −0.32 0.17 −1.21†
(0.34) (0.44) (0.60) (0.35) (0.44) (0.69)
Individualistic 0.23 0.78 −0.56 0.15 0.84† −0.56
(0.35) (0.49) (0.61) (0.35) (0.48) (0.60)
Moralistic −0.30 0.48 −1.47∗ −0.24 0.38 −1.28†
(0.36) (0.47) (0.65) (0.35) (0.47) (0.66)
Constant −2.00∗∗ −2.89∗∗ −0.84 −1.27† −2.50∗ −0.23
(0.75) (0.97) (1.70) (0.74) (0.99) (1.72)
N 399 233 166 399 233 166
AIC 461.64 288.58 175.96 469.01 296.51 174.02
BIC 685.03 468.03 337.79 692.39 475.97 335.85
logL −174.82 −92.29 −35.98 −178.51 −96.26 −35.01
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
Reference Categories = Party Incumbent, Closed Primary, Traditionalistic
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Table 4.6: Alternative Measure of Primary Divisiveness
Endorsement Policy Elected Officials
All Dem Rep All Dem Rep
Required Neutrality −0.01 0.58 −1.25∗
(0.27) (0.37) (0.50)
Officials −0.25 0.15 −0.83†
(0.22) (0.29) (0.48)
Democratic Primary 0.10 0.09
(0.21) (0.21)
Opponent Incumbent 2.38∗∗∗ 3.82∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 2.41∗∗∗ 3.70∗∗∗ 2.71∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.62) (0.54) (0.27) (0.61) (0.54)
Open Seat 2.98∗∗∗ 3.73∗∗∗ 3.63∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.60) (0.49) (0.31) (0.58) (0.49)
Trump Vote −0.01 −3.55∗ 0.46 0.02 −3.27∗ 0.89
(0.69) (1.41) (1.41) (0.69) (1.39) (1.42)
Competitive District 0.21 −0.40 0.79† 0.22 −0.39 0.78†
(0.25) (0.35) (0.42) (0.25) (0.34) (0.41)
Professionalism −1.69 0.40 −5.89∗ −1.91 −0.27 −4.84∗
(1.40) (1.93) (2.29) (1.37) (1.91) (2.24)
Partially Closed 0.14 −0.39 1.48∗ 0.16 −0.49 1.14
(0.43) (0.57) (0.71) (0.43) (0.57) (0.69)
Partially Open −0.19 −0.39 0.17 −0.31 −0.38 −0.73
(0.32) (0.44) (0.50) (0.33) (0.44) (0.64)
Open to Unaffiliated Voters −0.34 −0.28 −0.44 −0.38 −0.25 −0.57
(0.33) (0.46) (0.51) (0.33) (0.46) (0.52)
Open −0.38 −0.41 −0.75 −0.50† −0.29 −1.10†
(0.28) (0.39) (0.49) (0.30) (0.40) (0.57)
Individualistic −0.12 −0.01 −0.52 −0.13 0.07 −0.07
(0.30) (0.41) (0.51) (0.30) (0.41) (0.49)
Moralistic −0.57† −0.56 −0.63 −0.51† −0.64 −0.52
(0.30) (0.41) (0.52) (0.31) (0.41) (0.51)
Constant −1.93∗∗ −1.53† −1.12 −1.72∗∗ −1.42 −1.30
(0.60) (0.85) (1.19) (0.61) (0.89) (1.22)
N 662 343 319 662 343 319
AIC 670.15 379.60 280.06 668.83 381.79 283.71
BIC 921.88 579.16 475.85 920.56 581.35 479.50
logL −279.07 −137.80 −88.03 −278.41 −138.90 −89.85
† significant at p < .10; ∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001




Previous research finds political parties, when viewed as broad networks, are able to
sway legislative primary elections towards their desired outcomes by acting in support of
their preferred candidates. This dissertation shows the institutional aspect of state political
parties, their formal organizations and rules, also play an important part in shaping pri-
mary elections, at least for the House of Representatives. First, state party rules pertaining
to diversity among state central committee members are strongly connected to candidates’
emergence. Chapter 2 reveals women are better represented in state Democratic parties
compared to state Republican parties. While varying levels of gender diversity in state Re-
publican parties seem to have very little influence of the emergence of Republican women,
Democratic women are more likely to run for the House of Representatives representing state
parties with more women members and leaders. Chapter 3 shows this trend also applies to
youth representation as state Democratic parties with higher levels of youth party committee
membership are more likely to nominate younger candidates for the House of Representa-
tives. Together, these two chapters reveal that at least among Democrats, diversity among
the membership and leadership of state and local political parties leads to a more diverse
Congress. Moreover, these chapters show political parties have a straightforward method of
promoting diversity amongst their membership, mandating it in their rules.
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Beyond their influence on candidate emergence, Chapter 4 shows state party rules also
have important implications for levels of electoral competition during congressional primary
elections. Specifically, state Democratic parties see fewer divisive primaries when they have
rules allowing the party to endorse their preferred candidates during contested primaries. In
comparison, state Republican parties see fewer divisive primaries and fewer total primary
candidates, when they give their co-partisan elected officials ex-officio party committee mem-
bership. Whether party actors had these specific goals in mind when implementing these
rules is unclear, but what is clear it that the rules of state political parties influence levels
of primary competition in addition to the candidate emergence process.
While the analyses in the preceding chapters reveal a clear link between the rules of state
political parties and primary election outcomes, what is less clear is why individual party
rules do not have the same effect in each party. For example, why do rules intended to
promote greater diversity among the membership of state parties contribute to more diverse
candidates among Democrats, but not Republicans? Similarly, why is the presence of elected
officials among the members of state central committees so meaningful for Republican parties,
but not Democratic parties? Although it would likely require another dissertation length
project to fully consider these questions, these are questions that need to be answered in
order to fully understand the role of state political parties in congressional elections. For
this reason, I conclude by offering some potential explanations for these party differences as
suggested by the broader literature on political parties.
One explanation for why party rules have differing effects among state Democratic parties
and state Republican parties is the differences seen in who identifies with the Democratic
Party compared to the Republican Party. It has long been noted that Democratic voters and
identifiers are more diverse than Republican voters and identifiers and if anything, this trend
has grown over time. This is especially true of the two aspects of representation, gender and
age, examined in this dissertation. Since 2010, the percentage of women who identify with or
leaned towards the Democratic Party increased from about 51 percent to 56 percent in 2017
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(Pew Research Center 2018). Similarly, the already large generational gap in partisanship
continues to grow. In 2017, 59 percent of Millennials either identified with or leaned towards
the Democratic Party compared to 53 percent in 2014 (Pew Research Center 2018). At the
same time, the percentage of the Silent Generation who identity with or lean towards the
Republican Party has increased from about 45 percent in 1994 to 52 percent in 2017 (Pew
Research Center 2018). These shifting demographic trends likely play a role in explaining
why state party rules intended to diversify state central committees do not also have the
effect of diversifying Republican congressional candidates. As Democratic parties become
more diverse, there is a growing segment of Democratic identifiers who may become more
inspired to participate in politics and maybe even run for office, but the same is note true
of Republican parties. Since Republican identifiers are more likely to be men and older in
age, the Republican Party has a smaller segment of the population who may be inspired by
efforts to diverse their state and local parties.
The goals and values of each political party likely offer another explanation as to why
state party rules have differing effects across party lines. Past research finds the Republican
Party is organized around an ideological movement with members valuing ideological purity,
while the Democratic Party should be viewed as a collection of social groups who seek con-
crete government action (Grossmann & Hopkins 2016). Similarly, as previously stated, the
Republican Party has been less likely than the Democrat Party to embrace identity politics
(Crowder-Meyer & Cooperman 2018), and the Republican Party is more likely than the
Democratic Party to view their affiliated organizations as party actors opposed to allies with
independent goals (Freeman 1986). Overall, since the Republican Party prioritizes ideology
above all else, but the Democratic Party has shown a greater willingness to work towards the
goals of diverse groups, it is not surprising identical party rules result in different outcomes.
Once again in the case of rules designed around promoting diversity, state Democratic par-
ties see more diverse candidates running for office because one of their goals is actually to
increase diversity in government. However, the Republican Party prioritizes ideological pu-
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rity over increased diversity in government which means party rules promoting diversity in
the state central committee may not be enough to also attract diverse candidates for other
elected offices. This is exemplified by the finding that many Republican women who do hold
elected office are often as conservative as Republican men (Barnes & Cassese 2017, Osborn,
Kreitzer, Schilling & Hayes Clark 2019).
The Republican Party’s commitment to ideological purity also helps to explain why the
presence of elected officials in state central committees reduces competition in Republican
primaries, but not in Democratic primaries. If the Republican Party’s top goal is being
represented by candidates and elected officials who share the ideological and partisan goals of
the Party, it makes sense that when incumbent elected officials are granted party membership,
the party goes out of their way to preserve the positions of their elected officials. In fact, in
recent years, incumbents are most likely to be primaried on ideology grounds, especially when
they are seen as being too moderate (Boatright 2013). Overall, the Tea Party movement
reveals the importance of ideology to the Republican Party (Grossmann & Hopkins 2016),
and it is not surprising that some of most competitive Republican primaries in recent years
have featured Tea Party candidates (Jewitt & Treul 2014).
Ultimately, future research should evaluate whether differences in mass partisan identifi-
cation and party goals and values provide a full explanation as to why similar state party rules
lead to different outcomes in Democratic and Republican primaries. Additionally, future re-
search should examine whether there are other implications to these party rules. Finally,
future research should consider what motivates state parties to change and implement new
party rules. I have demonstrated the value of study party rules and highlighted some of the
implications of certain rules, but a complete picture is likely more complex. It could be my
dissertation has identified unknown, or even unwanted, implications of select party rules and
that state parties’ true intentions behind some of these rules were much different. To fully
consider these lines of questions, researchers will likely need to work directly with the leaders
and committee members of state and local political parties in future research.
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